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CLEAN ENERGY FEDERALISM 
Felix Mormann* 
Abstract 
Legal scholarship tends to approach the law and policy of clean energy 
from an environmental law perspective. As hydraulic fracturing, 
renewable energy integration, nuclear reactor (re)licensing, transport 
biofuel mandates, and other energy issues have pushed to the forefront of 
the environmental law debate, clean energy law has begun to emancipate 
itself. The emerging literature on clean energy federalism is a symptom 
of this emancipation. This Article adds to that literature by offering two 
case studies, a novel model for policy integration, and theoretical insights 
to elucidate the relationship between environmental federalism and clean 
energy federalism.  
Renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs both seek to mitigate 
global climate change by promoting low-carbon, renewable energy. 
Despite their shared objective, subtle differences in the design 
characteristics and regulatory requirements of both policies point to 
different policy innovation pathways, recommending renewable portfolio 
standards for implementation at the federal level and feed-in tariffs for 
implementation at the state level.  
Contrary to the literature’s traditional view that renewable portfolio 
standards and feed-in tariffs are mutually exclusive policy alternatives, 
this Article proposes a model for closely integrating both policies toward 
a better, more efficient allocation of investor and regulatory risk. Properly 
integrated, such a joint policy regime could harness the competitive 
market forces inherent in portfolio standards and redirect them to 
optimize overall risk allocation. With aggregate risk mitigation greater 
than the sum of its parts, an integrated policy regime could leverage 
higher private-sector investment in renewables while requiring lower 
returns than necessary under less coordinated current policy approaches.  
From a theoretical perspective, this Article illustrates how clean 
energy federalism both draws on and advances the theories shaping 
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today’s environmental federalism discourse. Specifically, this Article 
calls for a more nuanced, multidimensional application of environmental 
federalism’s matching principle, offers support for a more open-ended, 
institutionally agnostic public choice narrative, and operationalizes 
dynamic federalism theory in the clean energy arena. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Anthropogenic climate change has evolved into one of the world’s 
most daunting challenges of the twenty-first century.1 As human activity 
continues to emit carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that trap 
more and more heat in the atmosphere, global warming brings with it ever 
more extreme weather conditions.2 From unseasonal droughts to massive 
flash floods, these conditions cause millions of deaths and trillions of 
dollars in economic losses.3 They also require millions of people to 
relocate, placing their livelihood and fragile geopolitical equilibria in 
jeopardy.4 Successful climate change mitigation calls for a timely 
decarbonization of the American electricity sector, the single largest 
source of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.5 Solar, wind, and other low-
                                                                                                                     
 1. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013—THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 13 (2013) (“Human influence on the climate system is clear. This is 
evident from the increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, positive radiative 
forcing, observed warming, and understanding of the climate system.”). 
 2. See id. at 5 (reporting increases in the frequency and intensity of heat waves, heavy 
precipitations, and other extreme weather and climate events).  
 3. See Atlas of Mortality and Economic Losses from Weather, Climate and Water 
Extremes, WORLD METEROLOGICAL ORG. (July 11, 2014), https://www.wmo.int/pages/media 
centre/press_releases/pr_998_en.html (reporting that weather- and climate-related disasters have 
caused $2.4 trillion in economic losses and nearly two million deaths globally from 1970–2012). 
 4. For a comprehensive analysis of the rapidly growing literature on climate and human 
conflict, see Solomon Hsiang et al., Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict, 341 
SCI. 1235367, 1235367-12 (2013) (concluding that “anthropogenic climate change has the 
potential to substantially increase conflict around the world, relative to a world without climatic 
change”). 
 5. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 430-R-13-001, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE 
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carbon, renewable energy technologies have the potential to mitigate 
climate change, ensure America’s long-term energy security, and foster 
economic growth with millions of green jobs. But as long as oil, coal, and 
other fossil energy technologies are allowed to externalize the cost of 
their carbon intensity to society and the environment, renewables will 
struggle to become cost-competitive. Economic theory suggests that a 
cap-and-trade regime, a carbon tax, or another form of carbon pricing is 
the most efficient policy to promote abatement technologies such as those 
for the generation of renewable electricity.6 Political and economic 
pressure to keep electricity affordable and America’s industry 
internationally competitive, however, impedes the nationwide adoption 
of emission pricing policies that capture the full cost of carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gas emissions.7 In the absence of a realistic price 
on carbon emissions, the long-term benefits of low-carbon, renewable 
energy will not be realized without near-term public policy support.8 
The debate over policy support for renewables across the globe and, 
more recently, in the United States, is dominated by two deployment 
policies––renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) and feed-in tariffs 
(FITs).9 RPSs create markets for solar, wind, and other renewables by 
requiring electric utilities to source a portion of the electricity they sell 
from renewable energy. FITs beckon renewable power generators with 
above-market rates for their output and guaranteed access to the 
electricity grid.  
                                                                                                                     
GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2011 ES-19 to -20 (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/climate 
change/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2013-Main-Text.pdf. 
 6. See generally NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN 
REVIEW 242 (2007); Dominique Finon, Pros and Cons of Alternative Policies Aimed at Promoting 
Renewables, 12 EIB PAPERS 110, 111 (2007), available at http://www.eib.org/
attachments/efs/eibpapers/eibpapers_2007_v12_n02_en.pdf; Carolyn Fischer & Richard G. 
Newell, Environmental and Technology Policies for Climate Mitigation, 55 J. ENVTL. ECON. & 
MGMT. 142, 143 (2008); Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and 
Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 165 (2005) [hereinafter Jaffe et al., Two 
Market Failures]; Atanas Kolev & Armin Riess, Environmental and Technology Externalities: 
Policy and Investment Implications, 12 EIB PAPERS 134, 136, 140 (2007), available at 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/efs/eibpapers/eibpapers_2007_v12_n02_en.pdf. 
 7. See Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 903, 
930 (2011). 
 8. See, e.g., LAZARD, LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS—VERSION 8.0, at2 
(2014), available at http://www.lazard.com/media/1777/levelized_cost_of_energy_-_version_
80.pdf; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT RENEWABLE 
ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 14 (2011) (comparing the generation costs 
of various renewable energy technologies to the cost of electricity from nonrenewable resources). 
 9. See, e.g., Marc Ringel, Fostering the Use of Renewable Energies in the European 
Union: the Race Between Feed-in Tariffs and Green Certificates, 31 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1 
(2006). 
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In the absence of comprehensive federal policy action on climate 
change and clean energy,10 states are increasingly stepping in to fill the 
policy void.11 Twenty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and three 
U.S. territories have adopted RPS policies to promote renewable 
energy.12 Despite the widespread popularity of RPS programs at the state 
level, however, many believe that a federal RPS would yield better 
results. Over two dozen proposals for a federal RPS and its more 
inclusive sibling, the clean energy standard13, have been introduced on 
Capitol Hill, but none has yet passed both chambers of Congress.14 FIT 
policies appear to be embarking on a similar trajectory. Inspired by FIT-
induced deployment success in Europe and elsewhere, a growing number 
of states have recently begun to experiment with FIT policies to promote 
renewable energy.15 As has been the case with RPSs, however, some 
                                                                                                                     
 10. In light of Congressional deadlock, the Obama administration has opted for an 
administrative approach to federal climate and clean energy policy. See, e.g., Final Rule: Carbon 
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 
EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 (Aug. 3, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60), available at 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cpp-final-rule.pdf; Final Rule: 
Standards for Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Power Stationary Sources: 
Electric Generating Units, EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0495 (Aug. 3, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 60, 70, 71, 98), available at http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpp/cps-final-rule.pdf. 
 11. See Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 879, 883 (2008); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate 
Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681, 683 (2008); see also Kirsten 
H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and Local Climate Change Initiatives, 2 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 123 (2008) (discussing state and local climate change initiatives).  
 12. See N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD POLICIES 
(2015), available at http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/
Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf. Eight more states and one U.S. territory have adopted 
nonbinding goals for the deployment of renewables. See id. For a discussion of the history and 
political background of state RPS programs, see Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding 
Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Spring 2007, 
at 10. 
 13. See, e.g., Clean Energy Standard Act, S. 20, 111th Cong. (2010) (including solar, wind, 
geothermal, and other renewables as well as clean-coal and new nuclear generation facilities as 
eligible sources of clean energy). While clean energy standards raise many of the same 
institutional questions as renewable portfolio standards, this Article focuses on RPS policies as a 
tribute to their far greater proliferation and lingering concerns over the long-term sustainability of 
clean-coal, nuclear, and other so-called clean energy technologies. See also Mormann, supra note 
7, at 910. 
 14. See Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. 
L. REV. 1339, 1341 (2010) [hereinafter Davies, Power Forward]; see also Shelley Welton, From 
the States Up: Building a National Renewable Energy Policy, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 987, 996 
(2008) (commenting on the many failed attempts to pass national RPS legislation).  
 15. These early adopters of FIT programs include California, Hawaii, Maine, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See S.B. 32, 2007–2008 Sess. (Cal. 2008); Decisions 
and Orders, Docket 2008-0273, Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n (2008); S.P. 367, 126th Leg., (Me. 
5
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consider the federal forum better suited for FIT implementation than the 
states, as evidenced by recent legislative attempts to establish a national 
FIT program.16  
A sizeable body of literature debates the merits of RPS programs and, 
more specifically, the controversial question of whether they ought to be 
implemented at the federal or state level.17 In contrast, legal scholars are 
only just beginning to explore FIT programs as a tool to help decarbonize 
America’s energy economy18 and have yet to engage the critical question 
                                                                                                                     
2013); H.B. 3039 (Or. 2009), H.B. 3690 (Or. 2009); H.B. 6104 (R.I. 2011); H. 446, Leg. 
Sess. 2009–2010 (Vt. 2009); S.B. 5101 (Wash. 2005); S.B. 6170 (Wash. 2009); S.B. 6658 (Wash. 
2010). Other state legislatures, such as Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New York, and Wisconsin, have recently debated proposals for feed-in tariffs. See H.B. 5855, 
95th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2008); H.B. 1374, 118th Gen. Assemb., Second Reg. Sess. 
(Ind. 2014); H.B. 408, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2010); H.P. 1061, 125th Leg., First Reg. Sess. (Me. 
2011); H.B. 5218 (Mich. 2007); H.B. 4137 (Mich. 2009); H. File No. 3537, 85th Sess. (Minn. 
2008); S. 3057, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); Assemb. B. 649, 2009–2010 Leg., (Wis. 
2010). 
 16. See Renewable Energy Jobs and Security Act, H.R. 5883, 111th Cong. (2010); 
Renewable Energy Jobs and Security Act, H.R. 6401, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 17. See, e.g., Christopher Cooper, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically 
Correct or Just Plain Correct?, ELECTRICITY J., June 2008, at 9; Davies, Power Forward, supra 
note 14; Joshua P. Fershee, Moving Power Forward: Creating a Forward-Looking Energy Policy 
Based on a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1405 (2010) [hereinafter Fershee, Moving Power 
Forward]; Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of a National 
Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49 (2008) [hereinafter 
Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market]; Robert J. Michaels, National Renewable 
Portfolio Standard: Smart Policy or Misguided Gesture?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 79 (2008); Mary Ann 
Ralls, Congress Got It Right: There’s No Need to Mandate Renewable Portfolio Standards, 27 
ENERGY L.J. 451 (2006); Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 
CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1428–29 (2010); Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress 
Got It Wrong: The Case for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for Policy, 
3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 85 (2008) [hereinafter Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It 
Wrong]; Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, State Efforts to Promote Renewable 
Energy: Tripping the Horse with the Cart, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 5 (2007) [hereinafter 
Sovacool & Cooper, Efforts to Promote Renewable Energy]; Welton, supra note 14; Robert J. 
Lunt, Comment, Recharging U.S. Energy Policy: Advocating for a National Renewable Portfolio 
Standard, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 371 (2007); see also Steven Ferrey, Renewable 
Orphans: Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State Level, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2006, at 
52, 53 (discussing the constitutionality of state renewable energy initiatives). 
 18. See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Reconciling Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-In 
Tariffs, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L REV. 311 (2012) [hereinafter Davies, Reconciling RPSs and FITs] 
(assessing the potential of blending FITs with other policy measures); Lincoln L. Davies, 
Incentivizing Renewable Energy Deployment: Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-In 
Tariffs, 1 KLRI J. LAW & LEGIS. 39 (2011) [hereinafter Davies, Incentivizing Renewable Energy 
Deployment] (providing a broad overview of FITs and RPSs); Lincoln L. Davies & Kirsten Allen, 
Feed-In Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 937 (2014) (discussing the effectiveness of FITs 
worldwide); Michael Dorsi, Clean Energy Pricing and Federalism: Legal Obstacles and Options 
for Feed-In Tariffs, 35 U.C. DAVIS ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 173 (2012) (discussing 
6
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of their ideal level of implementation. This Article is the first to address 
this crucial question by exploring the environmental, economic, 
regulatory, and political economy factors that determine the comparative 
merits of RPS and FIT implementation at the federal and state level.  
Empirical evidence and qualitative analysis indicate that the widely 
popular RPS—adopted by nearly thirty states—ought to be implemented 
at the federal rather than state level. Meanwhile, environmental, 
economic, and regulatory arguments suggest that FIT programs such as 
those recently proposed on Capitol Hill promise greater success at the 
state rather than federal level.  
To be sure, RPS and FIT policies could conceivably each be 
implemented concurrently at both the federal and state levels. Such 
cooperative federalism has long been a staple of U.S. environmental 
regulation,19 as illustrated by the Clean Air Act’s requirement of State 
Implementation Plans for the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards,20 with similar, albeit optional, 
delegation programs under the Clean Water Act for implementation of 
the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System.21 In each of these 
instances, implementing states have the right to go above and beyond the 
regulatory floors set by the federal government.22 Recent scholarship has 
planted a flag for a similar “clean energy floor” approach that would treat 
federal and state jurisdiction not as independent or mere substitutes but, 
instead, as interdependent and complementary.23 The same scholars 
acknowledge, however, that for the time being judicial interpretation of 
key energy statutes based on an implied preemption analysis appears to 
                                                                                                                     
conflicts between the federal system and state FIT policies); David Grinlinton & LeRoy Paddock, 
The Role of Feed-In Tariffs in Supporting the Expansion of Solar Energy Production, 41 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 943 (2010); Katherine D. Kelly, Note, Don’t Hide Behind Statutory Roadblocks: How the 
United States Can Resolve Conflicts to Implementing the German Feed-In Tariff Model and 
Contribute to International Efforts to Control Climate Change, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 726, 
768–73 (2012) (highlighting the “legal barriers” to implementing FITs in the United States). 
 19. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1963 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 7402 (2012) (“The administrator shall 
encourage cooperative activities by the States and local governments . . . .”); Clean Water Act 
§ 103, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2012) (same); Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 6, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1531(c)(2) (similar). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409–7410 (2012).  
 21. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). 
 22. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1564 (2007) (discussing federal regulatory 
floors in the context of environmental law). 
 23. Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. 
L. REV. 1283, 1288 (2013); see also Heather Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1549, 1551 (2012) (“It would be useful if scholars were more attentive to the fact that the 
questions federalism raises need not involve an either/or answer. Often they will involve a 
both/and.”). 
7
Mormann: Clean Energy Federalism
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1628 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
“have blinded regulators and courts from seeing the virtues of clean 
energy floors.”24 Accordingly, this Article proceeds on the assumption 
that RPS and FIT policies will each most likely be adopted, if at all, at 
either the federal or state level, but not both. 
RPSs and FITs have traditionally been treated as mutually exclusive 
policy options.25 Only recently have scholars and policy makers begun to 
embrace the possibility that both policies could, in fact, work “hand-in-
glove.”26 This Article goes one step further and proposes a model for 
closely integrating both policies toward a better, more efficient allocation 
of investor and regulatory risk. Properly integrated, a joint RPS–FIT 
regime could harness the competitive market forces inherent in portfolio 
standards and redirect them to optimize overall risk allocation. In 
interstate competition, these forces would help reduce the cost to 
ratepayers of FIT programs while driving sustainable deployment of 
renewable energy technologies. With aggregate risk mitigation greater 
than the sum of its parts, such an integrated policy regime could leverage 
higher private-sector investment in renewables while requiring lower 
returns than under less coordinated current policy approaches. 
Importantly, the proposed model can accommodate both the existing 
policy landscape of multiple state RPSs supplemented, in some states, by 
FIT programs and a possible future policy landscape with a federal RPS 
complemented by multiple state-level FIT programs, as suggested by this 
Article’s exploration of the ideal institutional level for implementing RPS 
and FIT policies.  
Legal scholarship often approaches energy law and policy, especially 
related to solar, wind, and other clean energy technologies, from an 
environmental perspective. Scholars lament the disconnect between 
energy and environmental law and call for greater convergence of both 
fields.27 Yet, as hydraulic fracturing, renewable energy integration, 
                                                                                                                     
 24. Rossi & Hutton, supra note 23, at 1356. 
 25. See, e.g., Ringel, supra note 9, at 1, 14 (“Feed-in tariffs on the one side and green 
certificates on the other side seem promising tools to foster renewable energies . . . . Whether 
feed-in tariffs or—more likely—green certificates will be chosen is only a first, generic 
decision.”); Davies, supra note 18, at 313 (reporting that, between FIT and RPS policies, “states 
traditionally have chosen one tool or the other”); Kwok L. Shum & Chihiro Watanabe, Network 
Externality Perspective of Feed-in-Tariffs (FIT) Instruments – Some Observations and 
Suggestions, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 3266, 3267 (2010) (“Different governments have attempted to use 
a price [FIT] vs. quantity approach [RPS] for renewable deployment”). For a critique of FITs, see 
Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-in Tariffs to Meet U.S. Renewable 
Electricity Targets, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 73, 76–78. 
 26. Davies, Incentivizing Renewable Energy Deployment, supra note 18, at 83; see also 
Davies, Reconciling RPSs and FITs, supra note 18, at 313 (questioning “the customary logic on 
renewable energy policy design” by asking “whether renewable portfolio standards and feed-in 
tariffs really must be mutually exclusive paths to a more sustainable energy future”). 
 27. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and the Convergence of Environmental 
8
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nuclear reactor (re)licensing, transport biofuel mandates, and other 
energy issues have pushed to the forefront of the environmental law 
debate, clean energy law has begun to emancipate itself. The emerging 
literature on “clean energy federalism”28 is a symptom of this 
emancipation. From a theoretical perspective, this Article adds to that 
literature by elucidating its relationship with environmental federalism. 
The inquiry into the ideal institutional level for RPS and FIT policy 
implementation offers insights that draw on and advance some of the 
theories that govern today’s discourse on environmental federalism. 
Specifically, these insights suggest a more nuanced, multi-dimensional 
application of the matching principle,29 offer support for a more open-
ended inquiry under public choice theory30 for the resolution of multi-
                                                                                                                     
and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180, 204 (2013) (expressing hope that states will 
continue to bridge the environmental/energy law divide with the federal government soon 
following suit); Amy J. Wildermuth, The Next Step: The Integration of Energy Law and 
Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 380 (2011) (lamenting that “energy law and 
environmental law today have little to do with each other”); see also id. at 369 (arguing that 
“energy law must become more integrated with environmental law”); Lincoln L. Davies, 
Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 473, 474–75 
(2010) (noting that “the law has long thought of energy and the environment as distinct” and 
observing the “need to bring energy and environmental law closer together”). 
 28. The term “clean energy federalism” is borrowed from Rossi & Hutton, supra note 23, 
at 1284 (applied to subnational clean energy regulation). Unlike Rossi & Hutton, this Article uses 
the term “clean energy federalism” to include governance issues related to the law and policy of 
clean energy across all levels of governance, including national, subnational, and supranational 
institutions. See also Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission 
Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1802 (2012) 
(discussing the “complex mix of federal, state, and regional laws, policies, and politics governing 
both renewable energy goals and transmission planning and siting”); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah 
J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Osofsky & Wiseman, 
Hybrid Energy Governance] (developing a novel theory of energy governance and using it to 
assess how institutional innovation can help meet critical energy challenges, such as risk 
management for hydraulic fracturing, electricity grid stability, and renewable energy integration); 
David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 
161 U. PENN. L. REV. 431 (2013) (offering a policy-neutral inquiry into the specific federalism 
questions posed by hydraulic fracturing for natural gas); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, 
Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773, 779 (2013) [hereinafter Osofsky & Wiseman, 
Dynamic Energy Federalism] (laying out principles for a rethinking of energy governance 
allowing, among others, for more effective integration of cleaner energy sources). 
 29. The matching principle stipulates that “the size of the geographic area affected by a 
specific pollution source should determine the appropriate governmental level for responding to 
the pollution.” Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: 
The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 
(1996). 
 30. Originally derived from microeconomics, public choice theory treats regulatory 
decision making as an analogue to market decision making where legislative, regulatory, and 
electoral institutions form an economy in which various actors, including citizens, interest groups, 
and policy makers, exchange regulatory goods based on the same market principles governing the 
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level governance issues, and operationalize dynamic federalism theory31 
in the clean energy arena. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part One offers a primer on RPS 
and FIT policies. Part Two critically reviews the scholarly debate over 
the ideal institutional level of RPS implementation, tests the validity of 
the primary arguments on both sides of the federal/state divide for FIT 
implementation, and explores policy-specific arguments bearing on the 
ideal locus for FIT policy implementation. Part Three develops the model 
for closer integration of RPS and FIT policies toward more efficient 
allocation of investor and regulatory risk and to harness interstate 
competition as a catalyst for clean energy technology innovation. Part 
Four relates the insights gleaned from the RPS and FIT case studies in 
clean energy federalism to some of the most prominent federalism 
theories in environmental law today. 
I.  CLEAN ENERGY POLICY–A PRIMER 
Public policy support for clean energy deployment, in the United 
States and around the world, comes in a variety of forms, including tax 
breaks,32 reverse auction mechanisms,33 net energy metering,34 and many 
more. In keeping with the institutional questions this Article seeks to 
explore, this Part focuses on two of today’s most dominant policies35—
RPS and FIT. 
                                                                                                                     
demand and supply of ordinary economic goods. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of 
Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34 (1998); Richard 
A. Posner, Theories of Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 595 (1974). 
 31. The literature on dynamic federalism seeks to resolve the issue of multi-level 
governance through multi-layered, interdependent models of governance to incorporate 
interactions both between and among various levels of government. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, 
Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 
(2006). 
 32. See, e.g., Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits: Smarter Tax Policy for a Cleaner, More 
Democratic Energy Future, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 303 (2014) (critiquing the inefficiencies of federal 
tax support for renewable energy). 
 33. See, e.g., Claus Huber et al., Economic Modelling of Price Support Mechanisms for 
Renewable Energy: Case Study on Ireland, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 1172 (2007) (discussing Ireland’s 
reverse auction mechanism); Niels I. Meyer, European Schemes for Promoting Renewables in 
Liberalised Markets, 31 ENERGY POL’Y 665 (2003) (detailing how reverse auction mechanisms 
have fared in Europe). 
 34. See, e.g., John V. Barraco, Distributed Energy and Net Metering: Adopting Rules to 
Promote a Brighter Future, 29 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 365 (2014) (discussing the challenges 
and opportunities associated with solar net energy metering). 
 35. For an introduction to the potpourri of clean energy policies across the globe, see 
RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, RENEWABLES 2014: GLOBAL 
STATUS REPORT (2014), available at http://www.ren21.net/Portals/0/documents/Resources/GSR/
2014/GSR2014_full%20report_low%20res.pdf. 
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An RPS, also known as a renewable target or quota obligation, 
requires electric utility companies to source a certain share of the 
electricity they sell to end-users from solar, wind, and other renewable 
sources of energy.36 Utilities comply with these requirements through 
“renewable energy credits” (RECs).37 Eligible power plant operators 
receive one REC for every megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity generated 
from renewable resources.38 Independent power producers can sell their 
RECs to utilities to earn a premium on top of their income from power 
sales in the wholesale electricity market.39 In addition to buying RECs, 
utilities can also invest in their own renewable power generation facilities 
to earn RECs for the electricity they produce.40 Whether utilities choose 
to earn their own RECs or purchase them from others, the utilities 
eventually pass the associated costs on to their ratepayers.41 Most RPSs 
are technology-neutral and award the same amount of RECs for all 
eligible renewable energy technologies.42 Some jurisdictions, however, 
have implemented technology-specific RPS programs that offer carve-
outs or credit multipliers for select renewable energy technologies.43  
FIT programs, sometimes referred to as CLEAN contracts,44 are two-
pronged policy instruments for the promotion of renewables 
deployment.45 The “feed-in” prong guarantees renewable power 
generators access to the local power grid to ensure viable sales and 
                                                                                                                     
 36. See Reinhard Haas et al., A Historical Review of Promotion Strategies for Electricity 
from Renewable Energy Sources in EU Countries, 15 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 
1003, 1011–12 (2011); MIGUEL MENDONÇA ET AL., POWERING THE GREEN ECONOMY—THE FEED-
IN TARIFF HANDBOOK 161 (Earthscan 2009). Some jurisdictions, including eight states and one 
U.S. territory, have adopted voluntary renewable energy goals. See supra note 12. In light of their 
limited promotional impact, this Article ignores voluntary programs and focuses on their 
mandatory counterparts. 
 37. See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1359–60; MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 
36, at 161. Internationally, RECs are referred to as Tradable Green Certificates or Renewable 
Energy Guarantees of Origin. 
 38. See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1378 (reporting that some states award 
RECs for every kilowatt hour (kWh) of renewable electricity generation). 
 39. See id. at 1360. 
 40. Haas et al., supra note 36, at 1012.  
 41. See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1345 (noting that RPSs do not change 
price or cost recovery determinations).  
 42. Cf. id. at 1377 (pointing to technology-specific REC multipliers in only about sixteen 
states in the United States). 
 43. Id. For a critical discussion of the constitutional challenges inherent in some of these 
programs, see generally Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce 
Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 
ENVTL. L. 295 (2013). 
 44. See History, CLEAN COALITION, http://www.clean-coalition.org/about/history (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2015).  
 45. See Rickerson et al., supra note 25, at 73.  
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distribution channels.46 The “tariff” prong requires local electric utilities 
to purchase the power output of these generators at above-market rates 
designed to cover the generator’s cost and offer a reasonable return on 
investment.47 These above-market rates can be set as a fixed total price 
for electricity from renewables, a premium to be paid in addition to the 
market price, or a percentage of retail rates.48 While RPS policies call on 
the market’s invisible hand to determine trading prices for RECs, FIT 
programs require regulators to set the rates for renewable electricity at a 
level that incentivizes investment without offering windfall profits.49 
Like their RPS counterpart, FIT policies allow utilities to pass the costs 
of premium payments for renewable energy on to their ratepayers.50 FITs 
tend to be technology-specific, offering different tariff rates for different 
strands of renewable energy technologies based on their respective 
technological maturity and generation costs.51 In addition, FIT design can 
be size-sensitive in order to account for the different cost structures of 
large utility-scale and small distributed-generation facilities.52 
II.  EXPLORING THE IDEAL LEVEL FOR CLEAN ENERGY POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION 
America’s energy sector is governed by a shared allocation of 
regulatory authority between federal and state actors. The resulting 
potential for cooperation and competition among different levels of 
government poses difficult institutional questions for climate and clean 
energy policy, fueling a heated debate over the appropriate level for 
implementation of RPS policies. The same questions begin to present 
themselves in the context of FIT policy implementation as more and more 
                                                                                                                     
 46. See id.  
 47. See id. The first ever FIT in the United States, implemented with great success by the 
municipality of Gainesville, Florida, was designed to offer a return on investment of five to six 
percent. See KARLYNN CORY ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., FEED-IN TARIFF POLICY: 
DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND RPS POLICY INTERACTIONS 9 (2009). The duration of FIT 
purchase obligations ranges from eight years in Spain to fifteen years in France to twenty years 
in Germany. See Finon, supra note 6, at 115. 
 48. The second option is sometimes referred to as a “feed-in premium” or “premium feed-
in tariff”, see MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 36, at 40–42. For an example of the retail rate 
percentage option, see Lucy Butler & Karsten Neuhoff, Comparison of Feed-in Tariff, Quota and 
Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development, 33 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1854, 1855 
(2008). Unless expressly stated otherwise, this Article refers to all of these options uniformly as 
FIT programs.  
 49. MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 36, at 19. 
 50. Id. at  29. 
 51. Id. at 26. For an example of cost reductions through technology learning in solar 
photovoltaics and onshore wind energy, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
supra note 8, at 68, 101. 
 52. MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 36, at 27. 
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states begin to experiment with FIT programs to promote low-carbon, 
renewable energy.  
The following inquiry suggests that the ideal level of implementation 
for climate and clean energy policy is anything but straightforward. In the 
case of RPS and FIT policies, multiple factors require careful 
consideration ranging from geographical differences in renewable 
resource endowment to grid architecture and transmission availability to 
the shared allocation of regulatory authority. Whether policy makers and 
scholars prefer federal or state implementation of RPS and FIT policies 
depends, in large part, on the relative weight they assign to these and 
other factors. Absent such prioritization, two general trends emerge. First, 
RPS policy appears to be overall better suited for federal than state-level 
implementation. The benefits of a uniform federal REC market and the 
electricity grid’s interstate architecture ultimately tip the scales in favor 
of federal implementation. Second, FIT policy shows more promise for 
state than federal implementation. The greater ability to address the 
geographic heterogeneity of renewable resource quality and the snug fit 
with the allocation of authority across federal and state regulators, among 
others, argue in favor of state-level implementation of FIT policy. 
Building on the rich literature discussing RPS policy, this Part surveys 
and challenges the primary arguments for RPS implementation at the 
federal53 and state54 levels before testing the respective arguments’ 
relevancy for FIT policy.55 In light of the two policies’ functional 
differences, the RPS literature cannot possibly consider all factors 
relevant to the institutional questions surrounding FIT implementation. 
Accordingly, this Part concludes with a separate section that explores 
FIT-specific factors bearing on that policy’s ideal institutional level of 
implementation.56 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 53. Infra Section II.A.  
 54. Infra Section II.B.  
 55. Following the scholarly debate over a national versus state RPS, this Section does not 
address the underlying question of whether an RPS should be implemented at all; rather, it 
presumes the necessity of policy support for renewables and focuses on the issue of where, i.e., at 
which institutional level it promises the greatest deployment success. In keeping with the existing 
literature and empirical evidence of RPS and FIT implementation to date, this Article focuses on 
the federal and state fora as potential loci for the implementation of RPS and FIT policies. The 
recent trend toward regionalization of U.S. electricity market governance, e.g., through the 
establishment of Regional Transmission Operators (infra note 65), suggests that future research 
should explore the case for regional implementation of RPS and FIT policies. 
 56. Infra Section II.C. 
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A.  The Case for Federal Implementation of Clean Energy Policy 
Proponents of federal RPS implementation generally rely on three 
types of arguments to make their case for a national RPS mandate. The 
first type builds on the ecologies of scale of the American electricity grid 
and the environmental benefits that renewable energy offers.57 The 
second type draws on the economies of scale that a nationwide RPS 
mandate would achieve.58 The third type addresses concerns over 
regulatory competition and the threat of a race to the bottom as the result 
of a panoply of competing state-level RPS programs.59 
1.  Ecologies of Scale 
The ecologies-of-scale argument for a federal rather than state RPS 
has two prongs. The first prong relates to the design characteristics of the 
U.S. electricity sector and its power grid,60 while the second prong builds 
on the scale and public goods nature of the environmental benefits that 
renewable energy technologies create.61 
a.  The Ecology of the U.S. Electricity Sector 
U.S. power grids rarely follow state lines.62 While there is no seamless 
national power grid,63 two of the three primary power grids—also 
referred to as interconnects—serve multiple states.64 Orders No. 888, 
889, and 2000 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
have led to the formation of a number of Regional Transmission 
Operators, each of which encompass several different states.65 As a 
tribute to the electricity grid’s interstate architecture, courts have long 
                                                                                                                     
 57. Infra Subsection II.A.1.  
 58. Infra Subsection II.A.2.  
 59. Infra Subsection II.A.3.  
 60. Infra Subsection II.A.1.a.  
 61. Infra Subsection II.A.1.b.  
 62. See, e.g., Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1362–63 & n.139. 
 63. For a discussion of the vision for a U.S. National Transmission Superhighway and the 
seemingly insurmountable obstacles it faces, see PETER FOX-PENNER ET AL., SMART POWER—
CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 89–92 (Island Press 
2014). 
 64. See North American Electricity Reliability Corporation Interconnections, U.S. DEP’T 
OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/NERC_Interconne 
ction_1A.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2015). Texas Interconnect serves most of Texas. The Eastern 
Interconnect covers parts of Montana, Texas, and South Dakota as well as Nebraska, Kansas, 
Oklahoma, and all points east. The Western Interconnect encompasses the rest of Montana, Texas, 
and South Dakota as well as Colorado, New Mexico, and all points west. See id.  
 65. See FERC, Regional Transmission Organization Map, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/
electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updated Sept. 17, 2015). 
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acknowledged that the flow of electricity is impossible to trace and 
inherently interstate in nature.66  
Furthermore, many electric utility companies serve customers in 
multiple states. American Electric Power, for instance, delivers electricity 
to more than 5 million customers through almost 40,000 miles of 
transmission lines, which cover close to 200,000 square miles, including 
parts of Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.67 Some 
commentators expect the formation of more multistate utilities following 
the Energy Policy Act of 200568 with its repeal of the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 193569 (PUHCA) that had imposed limitations 
on utility mergers.70  
Proponents of a federal RPS argue that only a national RPS mandate 
can account for and accommodate the U.S. electricity sector’s multistate 
ecology.71 State-level RPS programs are considered “physically at odds” 
with the interstate transmission system.72  
A policy’s scope and its level of implementation should reflect the 
size and structure of its regulatory target. The ecology of the U.S. 
electricity sector, therefore, can provide valuable guidance in the quest 
for the ideal level of implementation for renewable energy support 
policies. Such guidance, however, is only as valuable as its underlying 
ecological assessment is factually accurate.  
When advocates of a federal RPS point to the power grid’s interstate 
architecture, they tend to ignore the pivotal role of existing state and 
regional seams within the nationwide electricity network. For instance, 
different protocols and technical standards among the various network 
operators represent significant obstacles along the path toward a 
nationwide, seamlessly integrated power grid.73 By itself, a federal RPS 
mandate would do little to alleviate problems of network compatibility, 
much less bring about the idealized “National Transmission 
Superhighway.”74 To vindicate a national RPS with interstate 
                                                                                                                     
 66. See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7 (2002); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power 
& Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 462–63 (1972). 
 67. See AEP Sustainability—Reports and Fast Facts, AM. ELEC. POWER, 
http://2013.aepsustainability.com/fastfacts/ (providing a map from 2013 that indicates the 
coverage area of American Electric Power) (last visited Sept. 22, 2015). 
 68. Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 1261–1263, 119 Stat. 594, 972–74 (2005). 
 69. Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935). 
 70. See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1363. 
 71. Id. at 1362. 
 72. Welton, supra note 14, at 998. 
 73. See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 17, at 109 (pointing to different standards among 
Regional Transmission Operators as key problems “that cannot easily be harmonized”). 
 74. See FOX-PENNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 89–92; see also Fershee, Changing 
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transmission criteria appears almost anachronistic considering the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s recent curtailment of FERC’s 
authority to site transmission infrastructure.75  
FERC has long had jurisdiction over the terms and conditions of all 
existing electric wholesale, i.e., non-retail or end-use transmission.76 But 
it was not until the 2005 Energy Policy Act that FERC received minimal 
authority over the siting and construction of new transmission lines.77 The 
Act grants FERC siting and permitting authority where states are unable 
or fail to act if the area in question has been designated a “national interest 
electric transmission corridor.”78 Limited since its inception, FERC’s 
backstop authority has been further curtailed by the Fourth Circuit.79 In 
2009, the court held that FERC could not use its siting authority to 
override a state’s explicit denial to grant a permit.80 Rather, the court 
limited FERC’s authority to cases where a state refused to act at all or 
acted “inappropriately by granting a permit with project-killing 
conditions.”81 In 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
went even further by vacating the Department of Energy’s Congestion 
Study that formed the basis of the Department’s designation of national 
interest electric transmission corridors prerequisite to FERC’s siting 
authority.82 With such strong judicial pushback, it is hardly surprising that 
no transmission project has proceeded under FERC’s siting authority in 
the decade following the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.83  
Without superseding federal jurisdiction, interstate transmission 
projects are difficult to complete, as evidenced by the failure of the 
Frontier Line project. In 2005, Wyoming, Utah, Nevada, and California 
signed a memorandum of understanding to construct a 1300-mile 
transmission line that would leverage 6000 megawatts each of wind 
power and clean coal power.84 Since the memorandum’s signing, newly 
                                                                                                                     
Resources, Changing Market, supra note 17, at 67 (discussing the potential of a “nationwide 
transmission super highway” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 75. See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 315 (4th Cir. 2009); see also 
Fershee, Moving Power Forward, supra note 17, at 1417–19. 
 76. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012); see also New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 17 (2002). 
 77. See Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1221, 119 Stat. 594, 946–51 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824p). 
 78. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a) (2012). The Department of Energy has the authority to make such 
a designation. Id. § 824p(h)(2). 
 79. Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d at 315 (“Congress intended to act in a measured way 
and conferred authority on FERC only when a state commission is unable to act on a permit 
application in a national interest corridor, fails to act in a timely manner, or acts inappropriately 
by granting a permit with project-killing conditions.”). 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 83. See Fershee, Moving Power Forward, supra note 17, at 1418. 
 84. See Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market, supra note 17, at 67. 
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enacted, more ambitious RPS regimes (California and Nevada) and 
stricter environmental regulation (Utah) have further increased the 
expected utility of the Frontier Line.85 Yet, the project has stalled, 
presumably due to loss of interest or political will in one or more of the 
participating states.86 
The interstate activity of some of the electricity sector’s primary 
market participants is an undeniable reality, as the example of American 
Electric Power’s multistate customer base illustrates.87 But it is not self-
evident that the “trend of multi-state utilities is only likely to increase” as 
advocates of a federal RPS claim.88 Some commentators consider the 
2005 Energy Policy Act’s partial repeal of PUHCA ineffective at 
fostering a widespread consolidation process among electric utilities: 
“Although there was initial interest in a number of mergers following 
PUHCA’s repeal, many (and perhaps most) have not occurred.”89 
Remarkably, the strict scrutiny of proposed mergers at the state level is 
cited as one of the major reasons for the relatively slow move toward 
consolidation.90 One of the few exceptions to this trend, the 2012 merger 
between Duke Energy and Progress Energy, illustrates just how far the 
influence of state regulators over interstate utility mergers extends. Duke 
Energy’s then-Chief Executive Jim Rogers offered his demission “to 
assist” a settlement that ended a merger-related investigation by the North 
Carolina Utilities Commission.91 If anything, the post-PUHCA 
experience with utility mergers appears to have strengthened rather than 
weakened the role of state regulators. 
                                                                                                                     
 85. See Fershee, Moving Power Forward, supra note 17, at 1416–17. 
 86. Id. at 1418. In fact, even the project’s website has been taken down. In 2011, a visit to 
the site (www.frontierline.org) linked on the National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s website 
targeted a domain for sale and recommended its use for Frontier Airlines. The domain has since 
been taken offline. But see Alexandra B. Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional 
Approach to Siting Transmission Lines, 48 U.C.D. L. REV. 1895, 1926–28 (2015) (listing recent 
and ongoing efforts to build long-distance, interstate transmission lines to transport new sources 
of renewable energy from remote areas to load centers). 
 87. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 88. See, e.g., Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1363. 
 89. Fershee, Moving Power Forward, supra note 17, at 1420. 
 90. See id. For a poignant example of the state regulator’s pivotal role in utility mergers, 
see the D.C. Public Service Commission’s recent denial of Exelon’s $6.4 billion takeover of Pepco 
Holdings, as discussed in Thomas Heath, D.C. Regulator Rejects Proposed Pepco-Exelon 
Merger, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/
dc-regulator-rejects-proposed-exelon-pepco-merger/2015/08/25/e927f8ec-4b3b-11e5-902f-
39e9219e574b_story.html. 
 91. See Mark Chediak & Jim Polson, Duke’s Rogers to Resign Next Year in North Carolina 
Deal, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 30, 2012, 5:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-
29/duke-reaches-settlement-pact-with-north-carolina-over-ceo-swap.html.  
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The case for federal rather than state-level RPS implementation based 
upon the U.S. electricity sector’s ecology is not as clear cut as it may 
seem at first glance. On one hand, a federal RPS appears better suited to 
address the interstate nature of electricity transmission and trade. On the 
other hand, states continue to play a pivotal role in regulating these and 
other core activities of America’s electricity industry, including 
transmission siting and merger control.  
In the context of FIT support for renewables, the role of states is even 
more important. The policy’s feed-in prong generally requires state-
regulated, local distribution network operators to grant grid access to 
power generators that rely on renewable sources of energy.92 More 
importantly, state public utilities commissions oversee and regulate the 
local retailers tasked with buying up the generators’ renewable power 
output.93 Additionally, in markets without retail competition, the same 
state regulators set the retail rates that allow utilities to recover the costs 
of their above-market FIT payments by passing them on to their 
ratepayers.94 
b.  The Ecology of Renewable Energy’s Environmental Benefits 
The environmental prong of the ecologies-of-scale argument latches 
onto the public goods nature of the environmental benefits from RPS 
support for solar, wind, and other renewable power technologies.95 The 
generation of electricity from renewable sources is prone to free-rider 
issues with implications for both technology innovation and 
distributional justice.  
From an innovator’s point of view, investment in renewable energy 
technologies is wrought with risks and uncertainties.96 In addition to the 
risk of knowledge spillover innate to all innovative endeavors, innovation 
related to renewables suffers from another, industry-specific spillover 
effect. Reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental 
                                                                                                                     
 92. See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 36, at 29. An exception exists for utility-scale 
projects in remote areas where interconnection directly with the transmission network is more 
practical. Id. 
 93. Id. at  29–30. 
 94. Id.  
 95. See, e.g., Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market, supra note 17, at 74; 
Sovacool & Cooper, Efforts to Promote Renewable Energy, supra note 17, at 5; Welton, supra 
note 14, at 997–98. For a general discussion of the role of public goods in the context of 
environmental regulation, see Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental 
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 143–45 (2006). For an overview of the expected 
environmental and other benefits of RPS policies, see Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 
1370–75; Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 17, at 120–32. 
 96. For a discussion of the impediments to innovation in the realm of renewable energy 
technologies, see Mormann, supra note 7, at 933. 
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benefits derived from renewables accrue to the public at large, regardless 
of whether they support electricity generation from renewable energy, 
e.g., through an RPS-driven premium in their electricity rates.97 This lack 
of appropriability makes it difficult for renewables innovators to reap the 
full financial rewards of their innovative achievements and the 
environmental benefits they convey. As a result, innovative efforts may 
remain below the socially optimal level.98 Proponents of a federal RPS 
argue that its nationwide reach decreases the risk of environmental 
spillover, allows for better appropriability, and hence spurs greater 
innovation in renewable energy technologies.99 
The corollary to the free-rider problem’s implications for renewables 
innovation raises concerns over its impact on distributional justice. 
Advocates of a federal RPS draw on the public goods nature of renewable 
energy’s environmental benefits to argue that a national mandate offers 
greater distributional fairness than a panoply of state-level RPS mandates. 
A patchwork of scattered state RPSs, they claim, would allow all 
Americans to enjoy the environmental perks of renewables.100 Yet these 
benefits would be financed by the subset of their countrymen who live in 
states with—allegedly—higher electricity rates to fund their local state 
RPS.101 Proponents of a national RPS claim that it would eliminate this 
lack of distributional fairness and “level the playing field by creating 
consistent, uniform rules.”102 
When advocates of a federal RPS build their case on the global scale 
of renewable energy’s environmental benefits, they tend to overlook a 
variety of benefits, environmental and otherwise, that renewables create 
at a local level. To be sure, as renewable energy technologies reduce the 
emission of CO2 and other greenhouse gases responsible for climate 
                                                                                                                     
 97. See, e.g., Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 17, at 91 
(“[E]veryone benefits from the environmental advantages of renewable energy.”). A similar claim 
exists for some of the energy security benefits attributed to renewable energy. See Welton, supra 
note 14, at 997. 
 98. For a detailed discussion of the interplay between the knowledge and environmental 
spillover effects related to renewables, see Jaffe et al., Two Market Failures, supra note 6, at 166–
67. 
 99. See, e.g., Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market, supra note 17, at 74; 
Sovacool & Cooper, Efforts to Promote Renewable Energy, supra note 17, at 5. 
 100. See Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market, supra note 17, at 74. 
 101. See id.; Sovacool & Cooper, Efforts to Promote Renewable Energy, supra note 17, at 5.  
 102. Sovacool & Cooper, Efforts to Promote Renewable Energy, supra note 17, at 8. See 
also Welton, supra note 14, at 998 (“[N]o state is going to be willing or able to bear the costs of 
nearly half the states acting as laggards on renewable energy, to the detriment of the national 
interest.”). 
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change,103 they benefit the public globally.104 Reduced greenhouse gas 
emissions, however, are but one of the many environmental and 
economic benefits of renewable energy. 
From an environmental perspective, electricity generation from 
renewables significantly reduces air pollution from CO2, SOX, NOX, and 
other pollutants that fossil-fired power plants emit.105 Studies have long 
shown that the air concentration and adverse health impacts of these 
contaminants are particularly strong in the vicinity of coal and other fossil 
fuel-fired power plants.106 Recent research confirms that the transition 
from emission-intensive fossil fuels to renewable sources for power 
generation would bring with it significant improvements in local and 
regional air quality.107 In the same vein, renewable energy technologies 
such as wind and solar photovoltaics are significantly less water-intensive 
than their fossil fuel and nuclear counterparts.108 Water conservation is a 
benefit that tends to accrue at a local, state, or at least regional level. Solar 
and wind electricity’s sizeable contribution to water conservation is 
especially relevant in an era characterized by increasingly intense 
competition for and disputes over local water rights.109 The localization 
of renewable energy’s environmental benefits is even more prominent 
regarding the capacity of solar, wind, and other sources of renewable 
energy to mitigate the ecological risks and damages caused by the 
                                                                                                                     
 103. Carbon dioxide is only one of many greenhouse gases. Others include methane, nitrous 
oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride. Overview of Greenhouse 
Gases, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
ghgemissions/gases.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2015).  
 104. The worldwide impact of greenhouse gases and their reduction demonstrates that even 
a national RPS mandate would fail to fully appropriate all of the environmental perks that 
renewable energy technologies create. 
 105. See Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 17, at 129 (comparing 
emission profiles across generation technologies). 
 106. See, e.g., Jonathan Levy & Jack Spengler, Health Benefits of Emissions Reductions from 
Older Power Plants, 9 RISK IN PERSP. 1, 2–4 (2001). 
 107. See Kyle Siler-Evans et al., Regional Variations in the Health, Environmental, and 
Climate Benefits of Wind and Solar Generation, 110 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 11768 
(2013). 
 108. See Mark Z. Jacobson, Review of Solutions to Global Warming, Air Pollution, and 
Energy Security, 2 ENERGY & ENVTL. SCI. 148, 163–164 (2009) (comparing the water intensity of 
renewable and fossil-fueled electricity generation facilities). It should be noted that not all 
renewable energy technologies are as water-efficient as wind or solar facilities. Hydroelectric 
facilities, for example, require 4.5–7.6 gallons of water per kWh of electricity output. See id. See 
also Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 17, at 128. 
 109. For an illustrative example of conflicts over local access to clean and cheap water 
resources in California, see ELLEN HANAK ET AL., MANAGING CALIFORNIA’S WATER—FROM 
CONFLICT TO RECONCILIATION 56–62 (2011). 
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drilling, mining, and hydraulic fracturing required for the extraction of 
fossil fuels.110  
In addition to these localized environmental perks, renewable energy 
technologies offer a multitude of economic benefits at the local rather 
than national or even global level. Renewable power generation creates 
new jobs, many of them locally, e.g., for construction and maintenance, 
often in structurally weak, rural communities.111 
The environmental and economic benefits of renewable energy may 
not be sufficiently limited in their geographic scope to provide the degree 
of appropriability that would allow renewables innovators to reap the full 
reward of their efforts. The local character of these benefits is, however, 
significant enough to add a cautionary note to the free-rider narrative 
commonly cited in favor of federal rather than state-level support for 
renewable energy. Citizens of a state may initially be reluctant to finance 
climate change mitigation benefits for their out-of-state neighbors or the 
world at large. Yet, their payments also deliver a cornucopia of local 
benefits, such as improvements in air quality, conservation of precious 
water resources, protection of local ecosystems from harmful fossil fuel 
extraction, and the creation of employment opportunities. If today’s 
widespread state-level policy experimentation with RPS and FIT 
programs for renewables is any indication, these local benefits appear 
valuable enough to justify in-state support for low-carbon, renewable 
energy technologies—even if the associated climate benefits entail giving 
a free ride to out-of-state neighbors. Regardless of whether public policy 
support assumes the form of an RPS or FIT program, the diverse 
environmental and other benefits of renewable energy can support the 
case for policy implementation at both the federal and state levels. 
2.  Economies of Scale 
The economies-of-scale argument for RPS policy innovation at the 
federal rather than state level generally features two angles. The first, 
more general angle focuses on the sheer size of the U.S. electricity 
generation sector and its potential for scaling renewable energy 
technologies. The second, policy-specific angle emphasizes the benefits 
of a unified national RPS market for REC trading. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 110. For an illustrative example of the enormous environmental dangers of fracking, see 
David Biello, What the Frack? Natural Gas from Subterranean Shale Promises U.S. Energy 
Independence—With Environmental Costs (Mar. 30, 2010), SCI. AM., http://www.scientificameri 
can.com/article.cfm?id=shale-gas-and-hydraulic-fracturing.  
 111. Alan Nogee et al., The Projected Impacts of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 
ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 33, 42–43; Welton, supra note 14, at 990.  
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a.  The Economy of the U.S. Electricity Generation Sector 
Advocates of a federal RPS like to point out that a nationwide mandate 
would almost double the overall size of the relevant market for renewable 
energy technologies, at least in comparison to the number of states 
currently governed by RPS programs.112 As former Senator Jeff 
Bingaman famously argued: “There is one thing, however, that a State 
standard cannot do—it cannot drive a national market for the 
technologies . . . .”113 The greater size of the market for solar panels, wind 
turbines, and other renewable power generation equipment is expected to 
spur technological innovation and make low-carbon, renewable energy 
technologies more cost-competitive with carbon-intensive fossil fuel 
incumbents.114 Over time, a nationwide market unified by a federal RPS 
would allow for the establishment of a strong domestic manufacturing 
base for renewable energy technologies.115 Advocates of a federal RPS 
claim that, at present, the widespread reliance on imported generation 
equipment increases construction lead-times and shipping costs, and 
requires project developers to take costly precautions to hedge currency 
exchange risks.116 Finally, proponents praise a uniform federal RPS 
mandate for its cost-effectiveness as it would allow for the construction 
of new electricity generation facilities in those parts of the country that 
offer the best resource availability and lowest cost characteristics.117 
Public policy support for renewables, whether through an RPS or FIT 
program, will likely be more effective the larger its target market is. Thus, 
a national support regime promises greater policy success than a 
patchwork of state-level support policies. Proponents of a federal RPS 
tend to overlook, however, that geography is not the only determinant of 
the target market’s size or a policy’s overall impact. Other equally 
important factors include the level of the stipulated renewables quota and 
its reach, i.e., the eligibility criteria for targeted utility companies.118  
The steadfast opposition on Capitol Hill to a federal RPS or 
comprehensive climate policy in general makes it unlikely that an 
ambitious renewables quota would receive congressional approval in the 
                                                                                                                     
 112. Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1366–67; Welton, supra note 14, at 1000. 
 113. 153 CONG. REC. S7582, 7598 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Sen. Bingaman). 
 114. For an analogy to the technological advances in electricity generation from coal and 
nuclear energy, see Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 17, at 94–95. 
 115. See 151 CONG. REC. S6671, 6685 (daily ed. June 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Salazar); 
see also Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 17, at 96. 
 116. Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 17, at 96–97. 
 117. See Welton, supra note 14, at 1000. 
 118. One of the few advocates of a federal RPS to acknowledge the importance of these and 
other design criteria is Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1385–90.  
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/3
2015] CLEAN ENERGY FEDERALISM 1643 
 
near future.119 To be sufficiently palatable for bipartisan support, a 
successful proposal would need to set a relatively conservative quota with 
a plethora of exemptions to accommodate local industry needs. 
Geographic gains from a federal policy approach would likely come at 
the expense of a federal RPS’s aspirational aggressiveness and thus spur 
modest growth in renewables at best. In the end, existing state RPS 
support for renewables may prove to be worth more than the sum of its 
parts would be in a federally palatable RPS regime with renewable energy 
targets that might reach further geographically but would likely aim lower 
aspirationally and, ultimately, have a shallower impact. Meanwhile, 
state-level support for renewables has set the bar fairly high, as current 
state RPS regimes already cover approximately 70% of the American 
population.120 Moreover, contrary to some RPS nationalists’ view, a 
federal RPS is not necessary to allow for the nationwide siting of 
renewable energy plants to exploit the most resource-rich areas of the 
country. Many state RPSs allow local utilities to meet their sourcing 
obligations with electricity and RECs from renewable power plants 
located out-of-state.121 
As a matter of theory, there is little doubt that an aspirationally 
aggressive, universally binding federal RPS would be more effective than 
today’s patchwork of independent state RPSs covering only seven out of 
every ten Americans. The political reality of two dozen failed proposals 
for a federal RPS, however, casts serious doubt on the viability of an 
ambitious, nationwide renewables mandate.122 Public choice theory 
suggests that electric utilities, energy-intensive manufacturing, fossil fuel 
interests, and other well-organized industries will continue to do 
everything they can to dilute, if not altogether prevent, a meaningful 
federal RPS.123 The same public choice challenges present themselves in 
the context of a federal FIT program, albeit in a different metric. While 
                                                                                                                     
 119. The Obama Administration’s decision to tackle the challenges of climate change 
without Congress illustrates the seemingly insurmountable obstacles to congressional support for 
comprehensive climate change policy. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S 
CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2013); see also supra note 10. 
 120. Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia currently have RPS regimes. See supra 
note 12 and accompanying text. The populations of these states total approximately 220 million, 
while the national population is approximately 319 million as of 2014. See American Factfinder, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/
productview.xhtml?pid=PEP_2014_PEPANNRES&src=pt (last visited Sept. 22, 2015). But see 
Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1341 & n.9 (recognizing at least thirty-six states with 
RPS regimes).  
 121. For an overview of local, state, and regional preferences or limitations in state RPS 
regimes, see Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1380. 
 122. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 123. For a more detailed discussion of public choice theory, see infra Section III.B. 
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the aspirational aggressiveness of an RPS policy is measured by the 
percentage of a utility’s electricity sales to be sourced from renewables, 
the ambitiousness of a FIT policy is commonly evaluated based on the 
premium that the tariff mandates utilities to pay above wholesale market 
prices for renewable electricity. Public choice theory suggests that a 
federal FIT policy would need to set relatively low tariff payments to gain 
congressional approval. A tariff set too low, however, is unlikely to 
achieve the desired deployment of low-carbon, renewable power 
generation capacity.124  
b.  The Economy of a Unified Market for REC Trading 
The principal argument voiced by virtually every proponent of a 
federal RPS draws on the economies of scale expected from a unified 
national market for REC trading. They criticize that the “multiplicity of 
state standards” has led to a “proliferation of state RECs markets.”125 
Additionally, they blame contradictory and inconsistent definitions in 
state RPS mandates for having “splintered the national renewable energy 
market into regional and state markets with conflicting rules on the 
treatment and value of RECs.”126 A recent study of state RPS mandates 
found that, despite creating a common ground for many renewables, 
“there is no single ‘renewable product’ across state lines.”127 The variety 
in definitions of renewable energy sources eligible for RECs is 
exacerbated by the “conflicting rules on the treatment and value of 
RECs.”128 Proponents of a federal RPS also criticize state RPS regimes 
for giving their certificates different shelf lives, ranging from three years 
in Michigan to indefinite validity in Arizona.129 The differing ability to 
bank RECs for future proof of compliance directly affects REC market 
value, inevitably fostering the creation of different subclasses of 
certificates. In fact, there is not even one universally accepted currency 
for state-issued RECs. While most states award one REC per MWh of 
eligible renewable electricity, some issue RECs on a per kilowatt hour 
(kWh) basis.130 In addition, state RPS mandates vary considerably in their 
aspirational aggressiveness as well as in their planning and enforcement 
                                                                                                                     
 124. See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 36, at 57. See also infra note 226 and accompanying 
text. 
 125. Welton, supra note 14, at 999–1000. 
 126. Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 17, at 105. 
 127. Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1376. 
 128. Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 17, at 105. 
 129. Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1378 & n.246. 
 130. Id. at 1378. 
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rigor, all of which affect—directly or indirectly—the market value of 
RECs.131 
Advocates of federal instead of state implementation of RPS policy 
blame the diversity of state RPS programs for their limited policy 
effectiveness and efficiency. In particular, the multiplicity of state 
standards is criticized for producing huge fluctuations in REC market 
prices, ranging from $1.75 in California to $35 in New England for a 
wind energy certificate over one MWh.132 As a result, compliance costs 
soar along with attempts to abuse the multistate system through double 
counting of RECs in various states and other manipulation.133 Some 
proponents celebrate a federal RPS as the panacea that will establish a 
unified national REC market with harmonized definitions, accounting, 
and compliance rules.134 A more liquid, transparent, and less volatile 
national REC market under the umbrella of a federal RPS is expected to 
increase investment in renewable energy technologies while saving 
utilities and their ratepayers billions of dollars in compliance costs.135 
Efficiency gains from a unified national REC market are likely the 
strongest argument in favor of a federal RPS in lieu of a multitude of state 
RPSs. Economic theory supports the claim that greater market liquidity 
will reduce price volatility while uniform market definitions and 
standardized eligibility criteria help drive down the cost of compliance 
for utility companies and their ratepayers. Meanwhile, state-based 
approaches to building a unified REC trading market across different 
state RPS regimes have proven largely unsuccessful.136 The market 
unification argument weighs heavily in favor of federal RPS 
implementation, but it has no bearing on the ideal institutional level of 
FIT policy implementation. As price-based support mechanisms, FIT 
programs do not rely on markets but on regulators to determine the price 
level of renewable energy support.137 
                                                                                                                     
 131. Id. at 1360–62. 
 132. Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 17, at 105. See also infra note 
238 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Christopher B. Berendt, A State-Based Approach to Building a Liquid National 
Market for Renewable Energy Certificates: The REC-EX Model, ELECTRICITY J., June 2006, at 
54, 57. 
 134. Welton, supra note 14, at 1000. 
 135. See Berendt, supra note 133, at 66 (“The security that a liquid national REC market 
would bring to U.S. renewable energy finance is of paramount importance.”). For projections of 
the expected savings in compliance costs, see Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra 
note 17, at 108–09; see also Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1379 (“Federal competition 
should not just make REC prices more uniform; it should drive them down.”). 
 136. See Berendt, supra note 133, at 54–55. 
 137. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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3.  Regulatory Leakage and the Race to the Bottom 
The third and final argument for a federal RPS builds on a commonly 
observed phenomenon in environmental regulation, often referred to as 
the “race to the bottom.” The concept points to the competitive 
relationship between various regulators, such as states, that aim to ensure 
a healthy environment while also attracting industry and business to 
ensure their constituents’ economic prosperity.138 Rent-seeking actors 
look to benefit from the heterogeneity of the regulatory landscape by 
(re)locating to states with less stringent or no environmental regulation at 
all.139 Such leakage is a common challenge for policies that aim to reduce 
pollution and other socially undesirable activities but, in the process, 
impose compliance costs on affected industries.140 Some proponents of a 
federal RPS claim that the existing “hodgepodge regulation” of state-
level RPSs promotes a regulatory race to the bottom between the states, 
with some trying to avoid leakage streams and others hoping to benefit 
from them.141 
The flow of leakage streams and, with it, the strength of the race-to-
the-bottom argument depend on the mobility of those adversely affected 
by environmental policy and regulation. In the case of RPS or FIT policy 
support for renewables, electric utilities and, ultimately, their customers 
bear the burden. RPS-specified renewables quotas and the purchase 
obligations imposed by FIT programs limit utilities in their procurement 
planning and choice of fuel sources.142 Given time, utilities may be able 
to shift some of their generation capacity from one state to another to 
                                                                                                                     
 138. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” 
and Is It “To the Bottom”, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274 (1997) (“The term ‘race-to-the-bottom’ 
refers to a progressive relaxation of state environmental standards, spurred by interstate 
competition to attract industry, that also occasions a reduction in social welfare below the levels 
that would exist in the absence of such competition.”). For a snapshot of the lively literature 
debating the validity of the race-to-the-bottom argument, see, for example, Daniel C. Esty, 
Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); Richard L. Revesz, 
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for 
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) [hereinafter Revesz, 
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition]; Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal 
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997) [hereinafter 
Revesz, Race to the Bottom]; Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: 
Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 67 (1996). 
 139. Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1368–69. 
 140. See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change and the Constitution, ENVTL 
F., July/August 2008, at 50, 52. For a discussion of leakage issues in the context of energy 
regulation and emission pricing, see Mormann, supra note 7, at 931. 
 141. See, e.g., Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1362, 1368–69; Michaels, supra 
note 17, at 107; Rossi, supra note 17, at 1431. 
 142. See supra notes 36, 47, and accompanying text. 
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escape strict environmental standards.143 But, they are unlikely to roll up 
the cables of their transmission and distribution lines or move their 
customer base out of state to regain their freedom of fuel choice. The risk 
of regulatory leakage from utility migration, therefore, is practically 
negligible.  
Ratepayers bear the financial burden of RPS- and FIT-induced 
premium payments to promote power generation from renewables. 
Private households and small businesses are unlikely to relocate solely 
on the basis of modest increases in their electricity bills. Empirical 
evidence suggests, however, that some particularly energy-intensive 
industries are sensitive to rising production costs from increased rates for 
renewable energy and may react by relocating their production facilities 
to jurisdictions with lower electricity rates.144 Sophisticated FIT design 
can mitigate, if not altogether prevent, leakage by exempting select 
industries from sharing the cost of renewables support without sacrificing 
overall policy efficacy.145 International examples of industry-sensitive, 
yet promotionally effective FIT programs include Austria, Denmark, 
Germany, and the Netherlands.146  
Upon closer inspection and consideration of the utility industry’s 
structural characteristics, the race-to-the-bottom argument carries 
relatively little weight in favor of a federal over state-level RPS and even 
less weight for federal rather than state implementation of a FIT 
program.147 
B.  The Case for State Implementation of Clean Energy Policy 
The advocates of RPS support for renewables at the state level build 
their case on arguments that fall into three categories. The first category 
rebuts the necessity of a federal RPS in light of existing state efforts to 
promote renewable energy. The second category harnesses the 
differences in renewable energy resource availability across states and 
their distributional implications. The third category emphasizes the 
historical role of states as the regulators of fuel choices. 
                                                                                                                     
 143. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 140, at 52. 
 144. An illustrative example of leakage resulting from high electricity prices for energy-
intensive industries is the relocation of a Spanish steel plant to Poland in response to increased 
energy costs. GABRIEL C. ÁLVAREZ ET AL., UNIVERSIDAD REY JUAN CARLOS, STUDY OF THE 
EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT OF PUBLIC AID TO RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES 33 (2009). 
 145. See, e.g., Felix Mormann et al., A Tale of Three Markets: Comparing the Renewable 
Energy Experiences of California, Texas, and Germany, 35 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. (2016 forthcoming) 
(showing that exempt energy-intensive industrial customers in Germany pay less for electricity 
than their competitors in California and Texas). 
 146. See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 36, at 55. 
 147. As this Article elaborates in Subsection III.C., there are strong arguments to expect a 
race to the top as the likely outcome of state-level feed-in tariff support for renewables.  
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1.  The Redundancy of Multilevel Efforts 
The counterpoint to the race-to-the-bottom argument for a federal 
RPS argues that existing efforts to promote renewables at the sub-federal 
level have proven successful and do not warrant displacement with a 
national RPS mandate: “Activities on a number of fronts supplant the 
need for a federal RPS.”148 References to a long list of local, state, and 
regional policy measures in support of renewable energy usually 
accompany this assertion.149 Others narrow the scope of the argument 
with a specific reference to existing state-level RPS mandates and their 
coverage of two-thirds of the U.S. population.150 Moreover, regulatory 
competition among states and their RPS regimes is expected to improve 
the overall quality of regulation as states learn from each other’s failures 
and successes.151 Ultimately, the redundancy argument is not so much a 
call for continued (and more) state RPSs as it is an argument against too 
much federally mandated support for renewables deployment, especially 
by way of a national RPS. 
The strong impetus for state-level RPSs and, more recently, for state 
FIT programs would appear to confirm the redundancy of a federal RPS 
regime. After all, more than 220 million Americans already live in states 
with RPS regimes.152 More than twenty states with a total of nearly 100 
million inhabitants, however, have not yet set binding goals for the 
deployment of renewable energy technologies.153 At present, state FIT 
programs in the United States cover no more than seven states and 
approximately 54 million Americans.154 Most importantly, a federal RPS 
or FIT would not necessarily have to displace existing state RPS or FIT 
programs. A multilevel RPS scenario, however unlikely in the current 
political climate, could emulate successful examples from other areas of 
competing environmental regulation, such as air quality, where the 
                                                                                                                     
 148. Ralls, supra note 17, at 451; see also Kevin L. Doran, Can the U.S. Achieve a 
Sustainable Energy Economy from the Bottom-Up? An Assessment of State Sustainable Energy 
Initiatives, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 95, 116 (2006). 
 149. See, e.g., Ralls, supra note 17, at 456–60. For further discussion of the role of states as 
energy drivers, see Steven Ferrey, Power Future, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 261, 284–87 
(2005). 
 150. Michaels, supra note 17, at 90 (“Since 2/3 of the population already lives in RPS states, 
it is not clear why adding the remainder will yield significant additional cost reductions.”). 
 151. Id. at 108. 
 152. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 153. Approximately 220 million of 319 million total Americans live in states with RPS 
regimes. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. This leaves more than ninety million 
Americans in states without RPS regimes.  
 154. The seven states with FIT programs are California, Hawaii, Maine, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, and Washington. See supra note 15. The populations of these states total 
approximately 54 million. See American Factfinder, supra note 120.  
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federal government sets minimum standards while allowing the states to 
adopt stricter regulation.155 Similarly, a state FIT policy does not 
necessarily preclude a renewable power plant operator from claiming 
additional federal subsidies, such as accelerated depreciation rates and 
tax credits.156 The redundancy argument, thus, carries little weight against 
a federal RPS or FIT and does little to promote the adoption of new state 
policies to deploy renewable energy technologies. 
2.  The Geography of Renewables and Distributional Justice 
The principal argument in support of state-level RPSs builds on the 
uneven geographic allocation of renewable energy resources across the 
United States. Based on regional climate conditions, topography, and 
other land characteristics, the endowment with renewable energy 
resources varies significantly between states and across different strands 
of renewable energy technologies.157 A nationwide case study found that 
the central United States, including Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming, offers the highest 
potential for wind energy.158 Eastern and southern states, such as Georgia, 
Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, and Virginia, have the greatest biomass 
resources for electricity generation.159 Geothermal resources are 
concentrated in western states, such as California, Nevada, Utah, and 
Hawaii.160 Some degree of solar energy is available in virtually every 
state in the nation, but its quality and suitability for power generation vary 
considerably.161 
Politicians have long harnessed the heterogeneity of renewable 
resources across the country to call for state rather than federal support 
of renewable energy technologies: a “one-size-fits-all Federal mandate 
does not take into account the specific energy and economic needs of 
individual States by requiring that fifteen percent of retail electricity sales 
be generated from specific renewable resources which are not prevalent” 
                                                                                                                     
 155. See, e.g., California’s more stringent standards for motor vehicle emissions adopted 
under the Clean Air Act’s waiver provision of 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2012). See also BUZBEE, 
supra note 22, at 1564 (discussing examples of federal regulatory floors in environmental law). 
 156. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 168(e)(3)(B)(vi)(I) (2012) (accelerated depreciation); 26 U.S.C. 
§ 45 (2012) (production tax credit); id. §§ 25 and 48 (investment tax credit). For a critical analysis 
of the efficacy and efficiency of federal tax credit support for renewable energy, see generally 
Mormann, supra note 32, at 318–23. 
 157. See Rossi, supra note 17, at 1431. 
 158. Fredric C. Menz, Green Electricity Policies in the United States: Case Study, 33 
ENERGY POL’Y 2398, 2400 (2005).  
 159. Id. at 2400–01. 
 160. Id. at 2401. 
 161. Id. at 2400. 
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in every state or region.162 The George W. Bush Administration opposed 
a federal RPS with the argument that “these standards are best left to the 
States. A national RPS could raise consumer costs, especially in areas 
where these resources are less abundant and harder to cultivate or 
distribute.”163 
The supporters of state-level RPS programs hone in on the 
distributional implications of a federal RPS. They argue that a national 
RPS mandate would result in a significant transfer of wealth from states 
with scarce renewable energy resources to those with an abundance of 
renewables.164 Under a federal RPS, renewables-poor states would have 
to buy energy and RECs from states with richer renewables endowments, 
dividing states into winners and losers.165 Advocates of state RPSs 
emphasize that state-by-state regulation allows for mandates that are 
better tailored to local resource availability: “States and local programs 
have been structured to take advantage of Mother Nature as well as man-
made and animal-generated products.”166 State-level policy is considered 
better suited to cater to the specific needs of individual states and to 
exploit opportunities peculiar to certain states and regions.167 
The heterogeneous geographic allocation of renewable energy 
resources and its distributional implications present strong arguments for 
policy implementation at the state level. Giving states latitude to design 
and implement the policy that best harnesses locally available resources 
would help limit wealth transfers among states. A federally mandated 
RPS or FIT program is unlikely to account for variations across states 
regarding renewable resources, load profiles, transmission infrastructure, 
and other key variables in the next energy economy. State policies, on the 
other hand, can be tailored to make the most of existing resources, thereby 
matching costs and benefits in geographic terms. Aside from reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions, many environmental and economic benefits 
of electricity generation from renewables accrue locally.168  
                                                                                                                     
 162. See 153 CONG. REC. H9843, 9848 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Stearns). 
 163. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATION POLICY, H.R. 6—ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005. 
 164. See, for example, the argument laid out by Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing 
Market, supra note 17, at 59.  
 165. For a summary of the “winners-and-losers” argument, see Davies, Power Forward, 
supra note 14, at 1367. 
 166. Ralls, supra note 17, at 468 (pointing to Maryland’s RPS, which includes poultry-litter 
incineration as a qualifying source of energy, so as to utilize an otherwise unused byproduct of a 
well-established branch of Maryland’s industry). See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTILS. § 7-701(r)(9) 
(West 2015) (listing poultry litter-to-energy as a qualifying renewable source under the Maryland 
RPS). 
 167. Doran, supra note 148, at 97–98. 
 168. See supra notes 105–11 and accompanying text. 
30
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/3
2015] CLEAN ENERGY FEDERALISM 1651 
 
Conceptually, state RPS programs can reflect the social value of local 
benefits, e.g., through credit multipliers for RECs from in-state power 
generation.169 However, the current wave of anti-RPS litigation cautions 
that such preferential RPS treatment for in-state resources at the expense 
of out-of-state firms may run afoul of the Constitution’s dormant 
Commerce Clause.170 With rate structures statutorily based on local 
avoided cost,171 state-level FIT programs are better suited than RPS 
regimes to reflect and reward the social value of various locations, 
technologies, and sizes of renewable power plants.172 Relying on the 
states’ ratemaking authority under the 1978 Public Utilities Regulatory 
Policies Act (PURPA), state FITs can ensure that local ratepayers fund 
in-state renewable power projects that yield local benefits for that state’s 
citizens to enjoy.  
3.  Historical State Jurisdiction over Fuel Choice 
Another type of arguments for state rather than federal 
implementation of RPS policy draws on the historical role of states as 
energy drivers.173 Traditionally, decisions over fuel choices, power 
generation portfolios, and resource development have been within the 
purview of the states, not Capitol Hill.174 The National Association of 
Manufacturers and the Edison Electric Institute—the electric utility 
industry’s trade association—jointly call for greater deference to state 
authority.175 The advocates of state RPS programs point to the 
acknowledgment of states’ regulatory authority under PURPA and, more 
recently, the 2005 Energy Policy Act.176 The latter, for instance, did not 
require states to mandate a specific fuel mix for local electricity 
generation but only to consider the implementation of fuel diversity 
                                                                                                                     
 169. For examples of credit multipliers, see Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1399. 
 170. For a discussion of recent and pending litigation challenging the constitutionality of 
state-level RPS programs on Commerce Clause grounds, see Steven Ferrey, Follow the Money! 
Article I and Article VI Constitutional Barriers to Renewable Energy in the U.S. Future, 17 VA. 
J. L. & TECH. 89, 106–09 (2012); Stephen Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: 
The Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS 
& ENERGY L. 59, 90–96 (2011); Lee & Duane, supra note 43, at 312–13. 
 171. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (2012). 
 172. For a more detailed discussion of FIT policies’ capacity to provide tailored support for 
renewable energy technologies, see Felix Mormann, Constitutional Challenges and Regulatory 
Opportunities for State Climate Policy (working paper, on file with the author). 
 173. See Ferrey, supra note 149, at 284. 
 174. Ralls, supra note 17, at 454; Rossi, supra note 17, at 1447–48. 
 175. See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1369–70 (“[S]tates and their utilities—
not the federal government—should be allowed to make their own fuel choices.”). 
 176. For an illustrative overview of states’ authority under PURPA and the Energy Policy 
Act, see Ralls, supra note 17, at 456–59. 
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plans.177 Similarly, existing state programs may be grandfathered in 
under PURPA in recognition of states’ historical jurisdiction over fuel 
choices and resource development.178 
The history of state jurisdiction over fuel choice is, in fact, a corollary 
to the geography-of-renewables argument. State fuel choice can appear 
as a regulatory tribute to the necessity of addressing geographic variations 
in renewable and nonrenewable resource endowment at a more localized 
level.179 Geography aside, states’ historical sovereignty over the 
composition of utilities’ fuel mix is not a strong argument to endorse state 
over federal implementation of renewable energy policy. From a 
regulatory perspective, however, state fuel choice is deeply embedded in 
the rules and regulations that govern the U.S. electricity sector. Any 
attempt to vest the authority to mandate the fuel mix of state-regulated 
utilities at the federal level would, therefore, require substantial 
regulatory reform. From a functional point of view, the history of state 
jurisdiction over utility fuel choice and its regulatory manifestation 
suggest that support for renewable energy through RPS or FIT policy will 
be more straightforward to implement at the state level. 
C.  Policy-Specific Considerations for Feed-In Tariff Implementation 
The preceding analysis of the scholarly debate over state versus 
federal implementation of RPS policy reveals that some of the principal 
arguments on both sides do not apply to FIT support for renewables. 
Careful examination of the U.S. electricity sector and the conceptual 
characteristics of FIT policies, however, suggests persuasive, policy-
specific arguments for implementing FIT programs at the state rather than 
federal level. The first argument builds on the federalist system’s 
allocation of regulatory authority for power generation, transmission, and 
sales. The second argument emphasizes the possibility to tailor FIT 
design to local infrastructure, resources, and demand.  
1.  Building on Existing State Regulatory Authority 
America’s electricity industry is governed by a shared allocation of 
regulatory authority between the federal and state levels. The 1935 
Federal Power Act vests FERC with jurisdiction over interstate electricity 
transmission and wholesale power sales, i.e., to utility companies and 
other power traders.180 States, through their public utility commissions, 
                                                                                                                     
 177. See 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(12) (2012). 
 178. For further details on the possibility of a grandfather provision under the so-called 
“savings clause,” see Ralls, supra note 17, at 465. 
 179. See supra Subsection II.B.2. 
 180. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012). The Federal Power Act defines the sale of electricity at 
wholesale as the “sale of electric energy to any person for resale.” Id. § 824(d). 
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oversee and regulate local distribution and the sale of electricity at the 
retail level, i.e., to end-use customers.181 PURPA has expanded state 
jurisdiction over rate regulation to include, within certain 
requirements,182 the sale of electricity from qualifying renewable 
electricity generators to electric utilities.183  
State-level FIT programs offer a perfect match with this shared 
allocation of authority between state and federal regulators. PURPA vests 
state public utility commissions with jurisdiction to regulate the 
interconnection of renewable electricity plants with the local distribution 
grid.184 This regulatory mandate includes the authority to require utilities 
and local network operators to grant renewable generators priority grid 
access, as required for successful FIT design.185 State jurisdiction further 
encompasses the authority to require utilities to purchase the electricity 
that qualifying renewable power generators feed into the grid.186 Finally, 
the regulation of retail rates for electricity sales traditionally lies within 
the purview of state public utility commissions.187 International 
experience with FIT policy design and implementation indicates that 
leveraging costs across all ratepayers best recoups utilities’ expenditures 
associated with above-market tariff payments for renewable power. Such 
cost recovery can be included in retail rates as a fuel surcharge or by 
means of a system benefits charge.188 Outside of fully restructured, 
competitive retail markets, either approach requires approval of the 
respective utility’s retail rates by the state’s public utility commission. 
Overall, state-level FITs fit the existing framework for U.S. electricity 
regulation as snugly as a well-tailored coat.  
In contrast, implementation of a FIT program at the federal level 
would require significant regulatory reform, encroaching upon traditional 
domains of state regulatory sovereignty such as local interconnection, 
                                                                                                                     
 181. See id. § 824(b)(1). 
 182. One crucial and highly controversial requirement is that the state-set rates do not exceed 
the avoided cost of utilities. For a list of the criteria that states have to consider when setting rates 
under PURPA, see 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e) (1985). 
 183. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2012). By definition, such transactions occur at wholesale and 
would normally fall under the purview of FERC’s regulatory authority. See supra note 180 and 
accompanying text.  
 184. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(c) (1985); 18 C.F.R. § 292.306(a) (1985).  
 185. See also supra note 92. 
 186. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a) (1985). See also Rickerson et al., supra note 25, at 78. It 
should be noted, however, that the Energy Policy Act of 2005 has created the possibility for FERC 
to exempt utilities from their PURPA obligation to purchase the electricity output of renewable 
energy producers with a nameplate capacity over twenty megawatts if these producers have 
nondiscriminatory access to competitive markets for the sale of their energy and capacity. See 16 
U.S.C. § 824a-3(m) (2012). 
 187. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). 
 188. See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 36, at 28.  
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distribution, and retail ratemaking authority. For many representatives on 
Capitol Hill, the risk of sacrificing state regulatory authority will, by 
itself, be enough to vote against a federal FIT policy. More than two 
decades of fruitless congressional debate over a federal RPS offer ample 
proof of the enormous challenges of building support for a strong federal 
commitment to renewable energy.189 With their market-based design and 
their environmental benefits, RPS policies have, at least in theory, the 
potential to appeal to both Republican libertarianism and Democratic 
environmentalism. If this bipartisan appeal was not enough to gain 
congressional approval for RPS bills, building support for a price-based, 
federal FIT policy will likely be even more difficult. To infuse the clean 
energy and climate policy debate with the threat to curtail state regulatory 
authority will make reaching a compromise more challenging still. 
2.  Tailoring Tariffs to Local Needs 
This Article has compared state-level FIT policy to a well-tailored 
coat because of its snug fit with existing state authorities under the 
federalist system of electricity regulation. In addition, FIT programs offer 
plenty of thread to weave in the intricacies of state electricity markets. 
Sophisticated and tailored FIT design can address the specific 
opportunities and limitations of a state’s existing grid infrastructure, 
renewable energy resources, and electricity load profile. 
America’s best renewable energy resources tend to be found in remote 
deserts (solar) and the midwest’s vast plains (wind), often hundreds of 
miles from the nation’s more densely populated load centers. 
Accordingly, transmission infrastructure or the lack thereof has long been 
identified as one of the primary obstacles to the large-scale deployment 
of renewable energy technologies.190 Struggles over federal versus state 
siting authority have effectively stalled new transmission projects.191 
State FITs have the potential to provide a partial remedy. Based on local 
infrastructure, a state can design its FIT program to include special 
incentives for distributed generation facilities. Unlike remotely sited 
utility-scale plants, such small-scale renewables facilities, such as solar 
                                                                                                                     
 189. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 190. See, e.g., Klass, supra note 86, at 1943 (noting that current challenges to the build-out 
of new interstate transmission infrastructure are creating a situation where “renewable electricity 
resources, particularly wind, will remain trapped where they are least needed”); FOX-PENNER ET 
AL., supra note 63, at 92; Klass & Wilson, supra note 28, at 1873 (describing the development of 
necessary transmission infrastructure as “a challenge of massive proportions”); Osofsky & 
Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 28, at 791 (“[R]enewable generators also lack 
access to transmission even when interconnection is theoretically possible, as abundant renewable 
resources tend to be located in rural areas far from existing transmission lines.”). 
 191. See Fershee, Moving Power Forward, supra note 17, at 1418. 
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photovoltaics installations on residential or commercial rooftops, often 
require only minimal upgrades to existing grid infrastructure.192 
Accordingly, distributed generation projects are subject to considerably 
less regulatory scrutiny and, hence, significantly reduce lead times and 
overall construction costs compared to utility-scale renewable power 
plants.193 Furthermore, distributed generation offers sizeable 
improvements in energy security, including increased grid reliability and 
reduced vulnerability to strategic attacks or natural disasters.194 Finally, 
locally integrated renewable energy facilities increase awareness of and 
reduce local reservations to renewable energy projects.195 Unless 
implemented as a clean energy floor196 or with a waiver provision 
allowing for greater state latitude,197 a federal FIT would not be as 
capable of accounting for the subtle differences in grid infrastructure 
requirements at the state or local level. Moreover, individual states are far 
better positioned than Capitol Hill to determine how much social value 
the various benefits of distributed generation add to their local energy 
economies. As a result, state-level FIT policies are conceptually better 
suited than a uniform federal FIT to reflect this value in their tariff 
structures. 
By virtue of its multi-tiered, technology-specific tariff structure,198 
FIT policy can be custom-designed to reflect the local availability and 
value of renewable energy resources. State-level implementation of FIT 
programs enables local legislators to tailor support for renewables to 
incentivize those technologies and project types that promise the greatest 
                                                                                                                     
 192. For an overview of these and other benefits of distributed renewable power generation 
facilities, see Melissa Powers, Small Is (Still) Beautiful: Designing U.S. Energy Policies to 
Increase Localized Renewable Energy Generation, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 595, 622–23 (2012); 
Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 897 (2011). 
 193. See, e.g., KRISTEN ARDANI ET AL, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., A STATE-LEVEL 
COMPARISON OF PROCESSES AND TIMELINES FOR DISTRIBUTED PHOTOVOLTAIC INTERCONNECTION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2015) (“Generally, larger projects require additional time for utility 
studies and approvals as well as more time for construction.”). 
 194. For an overview of distributed generation’s many energy security benefits, see David 
M. Sweet, The Decentralized Energy Paradigm, in ENERGY SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 308 (ABC-CLIO 2009). 
 195. See Mormann, supra note 7, at 963. 
 196. For the time being, judicial interpretation of key energy statutes based on an implied 
preemption analysis appears to prevent implementation of FIT or related clean energy policy in 
the form of a clean energy floor. See Rossi & Hutton, supra note 23, at 1356 (noting that implied 
preemption analysis appears to have blinded regulators and courts from seeing the virtues of clean 
energy floors). 
 197. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2012) (waiver provision for more restrictive vehicle 
emissions regulation by qualifying states). 
 198. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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local benefits to their constituents.199 Existing state policy support for 
renewables has demonstrated the ingenuity of state regulators when it 
comes to harnessing locally available resources, such as Maryland’s 
incentives for power generation from poultry waste.200  
Moving from local opportunities to challenges, FIT implementation 
at the state level can consider and address specific challenges to the 
successful integration of renewables into the local fuel mix. For example, 
states may choose different regimes for exposing renewables to the 
electricity market’s forecast and balancing obligations201 in order to 
reflect the availability and cost of reserve power that can compensate for 
the output intermittency of weather-dependent wind or solar power 
generators. States with abundant natural gas turbines, hydroelectric 
facilities, and other fast-ramping power plants, for instance, may be more 
willing to exempt renewables from their balancing responsibilities than 
states that rely on slow-ramping coal or nuclear power to supply the bulk 
of their load.202 A uniform federal FIT policy would not be able to 
account for these and other intricacies. 
Finally, state-level FIT programs are better suited than a federally 
implemented FIT policy to address one of the main criticisms of 
renewable electricity: the potential mismatch between renewable 
generators’ peak output and the system’s peak demand. The utility of 
electricity generated from wind turbines, for instance, is often questioned 
based on the annual and daily distribution of their output.203 Simply 
stated, the wind tends to blow primarily during the night and more so in 
                                                                                                                     
 199. For a discussion of the local benefits to be gained from renewable electricity generation, 
see supra notes 105–11 and accompanying text. 
 200. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTILS. § 7-701(r)(9) (West 2015). 
 201. Electricity is often traded in forward markets where generators offer to supply 
electricity to the system operator for five-minute intervals on a day-ahead basis. The following 
day, when the relevant five-minute window opens, the generator has to deliver the promised 
amount of electricity or else compensate the system operator under their imbalance settlement for 
balancing services the latter uses to cover for the generator’s lack of performance under their 
contract. The cost of these balancing services varies depending on the time horizon that needs to 
be balanced—the “replacement reserve” (hours ahead) is cheapest, with rates going up for the 
“secondary reserve” (minutes ahead) and peaking for the “primary reserve” (seconds ahead). For 
an overview of forecast and balancing obligations in forward electricity markets, see Corinna 
Klessmann et al., Pros and Cons of Exposing Renewables to Electricity Market Risks – A 
Comparison of the Market Integration Approaches in Germany, Spain, and the UK, 36 ENERGY 
POL’Y 3646, 3647 (2008). 
 202. For an overview of the ramping, i.e., balancing capabilities of different power generation 
technologies, see FOX-PENNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 96–112. 
 203. See, e.g., RYAN WISER & MARK BOLINGER, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2009 WIND 
TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT 50 (2010) (describing the Texas ERCOT experience with wind 
electricity output). 
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winter than summer.204 In the absence of economic grid-level energy 
storage, wind electricity is rarely available to meet peak demand resulting 
from mid-day air-conditioning operations in the summer months. In 
states with hot summers and relatively mild winters, such as Texas, wind 
electricity may therefore be less valuable than, for example, in 
Minnesota, where more electricity is used for heating than cooling and 
load profiles tend to be more balanced throughout the day and year.205 
Conversely, Minnesota may have less appreciation for solar electricity 
that will not be available to meet electricity demand for nighttime electric 
heating. A Texas FIT, therefore, could be tailored to incentivize greater 
deployment of solar power while a Minnesota FIT might place greater 
emphasis on the continued build-out of wind energy.206 More generally, 
state-implemented FIT policy can reflect and reward the social value of 
electricity from specific sources and technologies to establish the mix of 
renewable resources that best meets local demand.  
III.  THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS: INTEGRATING RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO 
STANDARDS AND FEED-IN TARIFFS 
Contrary to the literature’s traditional view, this Article does not 
regard FIT and RPS policies as mutually exclusive and, instead, argues 
that both can, and should, be integrated for better allocation of investor 
and regulatory risk and to harness interstate competition as a catalyst for 
technology innovation. With aggregate risk mitigation greater than the 
subtotal of its parts, an integrated RPS–FIT regime would require lower 
returns to leverage higher private-sector investment in renewables while 
ensuring sustainable growth in clean energy deployment.  
The energy policy literature has historically viewed RPS policies as 
an American phenomenon and FIT policies as a European 
                                                                                                                     
 204. See KATIE COUGHLIN & JOSEPH H. ETO, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L 
LAB., ANALYSIS OF WIND POWER AND LOAD DATA AT MULTIPLE TIMES 11, 17 (2010), available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/reliability/analysiswindpowerload.pdf.  
 205. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Form EIA-826 Detailed Data, available at 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia826/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2015). 
 206. In reality, the only places to achieve significant solar photovoltaic deployment in Texas 
to date—Austin and San Antonio—have both done so using solar-specific FITs or similarly 
tailored programs. See Mormann et al, supra note 145. In Minnesota, the state RPS along with 
federal tax incentives has proven a strong driver of wind energy deployment while a recently 
adopted FIT-esque value-of-solar tariff adopted seeks to provide tailored support for distributed 
solar power generation assets based on their specific contribution to Minnesota’s energy economy. 
See In re Establishing a Distributed Solar Value Methodology Under Minn. Stat. § 216B.164, 
subd. 10 (e) & (f), E-999/M-14-65 (Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 1, 2014), available at 
https://www.edockets.state.mn.us/EFiling/edockets/searchDocuments.do?method=showPoup&d
ocumentId=%7bFC0357B5-FBE2-4E99-9E3B-5CCFCF48F822%7d&documentTitle=20144-97 
879-01. 
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phenomenon.207 As a result, few commentators and even fewer policy 
makers have considered the joint implementation of both policies.208 RPS 
and FIT policies are not mutually exclusive, however, but rather have the 
potential to work “hand-in-glove.”209 Empirical evidence210 and 
qualitative analysis211 suggest that FITs are more effective and more 
efficient than RECs at delivering public policy support to renewable 
power projects. RPS targets can create markets for renewable energy, but 
FIT policies have proven more successful at delivering the necessary 
support to populate these markets.212 In recognition of this synergetic 
                                                                                                                     
 207. See, e.g., Davies, Reconciling RPSs and FITs, supra note 18, at 313 (“Historically, feed-
in tariffs have dominated in Europe. . . . Jurisdictions in the United States overwhelmingly have 
gravitated toward the RPS . . . .”). 
 208. See, e.g., Ringel, supra note 9, at 1 (“Feed-in tariffs on the one side and green 
certificates on the other side seem promising tools to foster renewable energies. . . . Whether feed-
in tariffs or—more likely—green certificates will be chosen is only a first, generic decision”); 
Davies, Reconciling RPSs and FITs, supra note 18, at 313 (reporting that, between FIT and RPS 
policies, “states traditionally have chosen one tool or the other”); Shum & Watanabe, supra note 
25, at 3267 (“Different governments have attempted to use a price [FIT] vs. quantity approach 
[RPS] for renewable deployment.”). For a critique of these suggestions, see Rickerson et al., supra 
note 25, at 76–78. 
 209. See, e.g., Davies, Incentivizing Renewable Energy Deployment, supra note 18, at 83; 
Davies, Reconciling RPSs and FITs, supra note 18, at 313 (questioning “the customary logic on 
renewable energy policy design” by asking “whether renewable portfolio standards and feed-in 
tariffs really must be mutually exclusive paths to a more sustainable energy future”). 
 210. See, e.g., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING RENEWABLES—BEST AND FUTURE POLICY 
PRACTICE 130 (2011) [hereinafter INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, BEST AND FUTURE POLICY PRACTICE], 
available at http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Deploying_Renew 
ables2011.pdf (observing a “general trend” of FIT policies performing more cost-efficiently than 
RPS policies); INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING RENEWABLES – PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE POLICIES 
101 (2008), available at https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/DeployingRenew 
ables2008.pdf (noting in a global comparison that the most effective FIT policies delivered 
significantly greater deployment than the most effective RPS policies); see also JOHN FARRELL, 
INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, CLEAN V SRECS: FINDING THE MORE COST-EFFECTIVE SOLAR 
POLICY 27 (2011), available at http://ilsr.org/clean-v-srecs-finding-more-cost-effective-solar-
policy/ (warning that New Jersey’s ratepayers must pay up to 83% more for solar electricity under 
the state’s RPS than they would have to under a FIT policy). 
 211. See Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, 42 ENVTL. 
L. 681, 723 (2012). 
 212. One key reason why FIT policies have proven more successful is their greater investor 
appeal. Even large banks, insurance companies, and other professional investors with the 
necessary financial acumen refuse to plan with revenue from REC sales. See, e.g., RICHARD 
CARRELL, PRUDENTIAL CAPITAL GRP., PRESENTATION AT 2014 AUSTIN ELECTRICITY CONFERENCE 
11, available at http://www.mccombs.utexas.edu/~/media/Files/MSB/Centers/EMIC/Events/
Conferences/AEC%20presentations%202014/AEC%202014%20Participants/Carrell.pdf (noting 
the difficulty to bank REC revenue); see also Gireesh Shrimali et al., Wind Energy Deployment 
in the U.S.: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Federal and State Policies, 43 RENEWABLE & 
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 796, 805 (2014) (reporting how direct federal support in form of the 
wind production tax credit makes state-level RPS programs effective). 
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relationship, California, Hawaii, Maine, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
and Washington have already begun to use FIT programs to finance 
renewable project development to reach their respective RPS targets.213  
This Part proposes a novel model for closer integration of RPS and 
FIT policies214 to combine RPS mitigation of regulatory risk with FIT 
mitigation of market, off-take, and other investor risk.215 Properly 
designed and implemented, an integrated RPS–FIT regime can harness 
the competitive market forces inherent in RPS policies and redirect them 
to optimize overall risk allocation.216 In interstate competition, the 
integration of existing state RPS programs or a future federal RPS with 
state-level FIT programs could drive a veritable race to the top as states 
compete to place first nationally in the global clean energy race.217 
Importantly, the proposed model can accommodate both the existing 
policy landscape of multiple state RPSs supplemented, in some states, by 
FIT programs and a possible future policy landscape with a federal RPS 
complemented by multiple state-level FIT policies, as recommended 
based on this Article’s inquiry into the ideal institutional level for 
implementing RPS and FIT policies. 
A.  Market vs. Regulation: Two Approaches to Risk Mitigation 
The principal objective of every policy for the build-out of clean 
energy infrastructure is to leverage private-sector investment and to do so 
as cost-effectively as possible. As with any investment opportunity, the 
investor appeal of renewable energy assets hinges on the trade-off 
between anticipated risks and returns.218 In theory, policy makers could 
simply offer unusually high, above-market returns to incentivize private 
investment in renewables. To do so, however, would ignore the need for 
cost-effective policy design and would impose a significant burden on 
taxpayers and/or ratepayers. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that 
targeted risk mitigation and re-allocation measures may be a more 
effective and efficient policy lever to incentivize private-sector 
                                                                                                                     
 213. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 214. This section builds on Felix Mormann, Re-Allocating Risk: The Case for Closer 
Integration of Price- and Quantity-Based Support Policies for Clean Energy, ELECTRICITY J., 
Nov. 2014, at 9. 
 215. Infra Section III.A. 
 216. Infra Section III.B. 
 217. Infra Section III.C. 
 218. For an introduction to the risk-and-return reasoning of debt and other investors 
regarding renewable energy projects, see DAVID FELDMAN & EDWARD SETTLE, NAT’L 
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AND REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT 
TRUSTS 22–23 (2013); UDAY VARADARAJAN ET AL., CLIMATE POLICY INITIATIVE, THE IMPACTS OF 
POLICY ON THE FINANCING OF RENEWABLE PROJECTS 3–6 (2011). 
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investment in clean energy deployment.219 According to one study based 
on IEA data from thirty-five countries around the globe, FIT policies that 
effectively mitigate off-take and other critical market risks for investors 
encourage up to four times as much clean energy deployment as quantity-
based RPS policies—despite offering only half the returns to investors.220 
Mitigation of one type of risk, however, often comes at the expense of re-
allocating, and possibly exacerbating, another type of risk. RPS and FIT 
policies both seek to reduce the overall risks associated with the large-
scale build-out of renewable energy infrastructure, but each policy’s 
mitigation strategy prioritizes a different type of risk.  
FIT policy design appears to be driven primarily by the objective to 
mitigate and, where possible, minimize investor risk so as to drive down 
the returns necessary to leverage private-sector investment. FITs achieve 
this extensive mitigation of investor risk at the cost of increased 
regulatory risk borne by ratepayers or by clean energy developers and 
investors, depending upon which side regulators err on when setting FIT 
rates and other critical policy parameter.221 In contrast, RPS policy design 
prioritizes regulatory risk over investor risk. Reliance on markets to 
determine the appropriate level of support for clean energy deployment 
relieves regulators of the obligation to set prices and other policy 
parameters, beyond the RPS mandate itself. Reliance on not just one but 
two distinct markets, however, significantly increases off-take and other 
market-related risks to clean energy developers and investors.222  
1.  Feed-In Tariffs and Investor Risk Mitigation 
Price-based FIT programs are commonly praised for the investment 
certainty they provide.223 By requiring utilities and/or network operators 
to enter into long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) at guaranteed, 
above-market rates to cover costs and offer reasonable returns on 
investment, FITs free eligible clean energy developers and investors from 
the need to sell their output on the open market. Rather than trading with 
unknown counterparts at rates determined by the invisible hand of 
fluctuating wholesale electricity markets, FIT-eligible generators are 
guaranteed both a lucrative sales price for their product and a 
creditworthy, well-funded off-taker, such as a rate-regulated utility 
company. In addition, many FIT regimes exempt eligible clean energy 
facilities from the forecast and balancing responsibilities imposed on 
                                                                                                                     
 219. See supra note 210. 
 220. See Mormann, supra note 211, at 703.  
 221. Infra Subsection III.A.1. 
 222. Infra Subsection III.A.2. 
 223. See, e.g., Butler & Neuhoff, supra note 48; FARRELL, supra note 210. 
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other generators in order to safeguard the electricity grid’s delicate 
moment-to-moment equilibrium between supply and demand.224 The 
intended effect of these FIT characteristics is the minimization of off-take 
and other market risks for clean energy projects. This risk-reducing 
approach is informed by the conventional wisdom that lower risks justify 
lower returns and, thereby, improve the cost efficiency of clean energy 
policy. The highly positive attitude of investors and developers toward 
FIT policies, observed in several independent surveys, suggests that this 
mitigation of off-take and other market risks addresses real needs.225  
The FIT approach to mitigating these risks, however, does not 
altogether eliminate the risks inherent in renewable energy deployment 
but, rather, re-allocates them. The certainty that market-independent 
prices afford to clean energy developers and investors comes at the cost 
of considerable regulatory risk. It is the regulator’s responsibility to 
determine which FIT rate will allow eligible facilities to recoup their 
costs and earn reasonable returns on investment. A tariff set too low will 
fail to attract the necessary investment to deploy clean energy as the 
Argentinian FIT experience illustrates. As a concession to political 
opposition, Argentina’s 2006 FIT for wind energy was set too low to 
inspire serious investment, leaving deployed wind capacity stable at only 
thirty megawatts nationwide—the equivalent of fifteen present-day 
onshore wind turbines.226 Closer to home, the city of Palo Alto, California 
is experiencing similar issues with its solar FIT that has failed to inspire 
any deployment since its adoption in 2012.227  
FIT rates set too high are equally problematic, offering windfall 
benefits to clean energy developers and investors while imposing undue 
hardship on electricity ratepayers, both of which may ultimately 
undermine public support for renewables as evidenced by Spain’s 
original solar FIT program. The Spanish regulators chose to adopt rates 
similar to those of Germany’s widely praised FIT only to find out that, in 
real terms, these rates were far too high in light of Spain’s 60% greater 
                                                                                                                     
 224. See Klessmann et al., supra note 201, at 3647. 
 225. See, e.g., Mary Jean Bürer & Rolf Wüstenhagen, Which Renewable Energy Policy is a 
Venture Capitalist’s Best Friend? Empirical Evidence from a Survey of International Cleantech 
Investors, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 4997 (2009); Sonja Lüthi & Thomas Prässler, Analyzing Policy 
Support Instruments and Regulatory Risk Factors for Wind Energy Deployment – a Developers’ 
Perspective, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 4876 (2011).  
 226. See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 36, at 57. 
 227. See Utilities CLEAN (FIT) Program—City of Palo Alto, CITY OF PALO ALTO, 
http://www.cityofpaloalto.org/gov/depts/utl/business/sustainability/clean.asp (last visited Sept. 
22, 2015) (noting “No applications in process” for the three megawatts of FIT-eligible solar 
capacity available). 
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insolation compared to Germany.228 As a result, the Spanish FIT offered 
renewable energy investors windfall profits at the expense of taxpayers, 
eroding public support for solar energy and eventually forcing Spain’s 
government to suspend its FIT program.229 As these examples illustrate, 
both ratepayers/taxpayers and developers/investors may suffer from 
exposure to the regulatory risk associated with FIT policy—depending 
on which side the regulator errs on setting the FIT rates.  
This underlying regulatory risk is compounded by the fact that most 
FIT policies set multiple rates to account for different technologies, 
project sizes, and other factors. Moreover, growth in deployed capacity 
fosters technology learning that drives down generation costs and 
gradually moves clean energy technologies closer to grid parity.230 Along 
the way, these cost improvements require constant monitoring and 
modification of FIT rates to keep investor returns reasonable and avoid 
windfall from tariffs that, say, fail to fall along with tumbling prices for 
solar panels. Otherwise, a FIT program that started out with appropriate 
rates may eventually become the victim of its own success and, in the 
process, deliver greater and faster deployment than ratepayers are willing 
to fund or the electricity grid may be able to absorb.231 
2.  Renewable Portfolio Standards and Regulatory Risk Mitigation 
RPS policies are frequently hailed as modern, market-based 
instruments to promote the build-out of clean energy infrastructure. This 
market reliance shapes the mitigation and allocation of risks under RPS 
regimes providing, among others, for significantly lower regulatory risk 
                                                                                                                     
 228. See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 36, at 59. 
 229. See The Government Will Temporarily Suspend Premiums for New Special Regime 
Facilities, GOBIERNO DE ESPAÑA (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.minetur.gob.es/en-US/
GabinetePrensa/NotasPrensa/2012/Paginas/npregimenespecial270112.aspx; see also The Cost 
del Sol, ECONOMIST (July 20, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21582018-
sustainable-energy-meets-unsustainable-costs-cost-del-sol. 
 230. See, e.g., PATRICK HEARPS & DYLAN MCCONNELL, MELBOURNE ENERGY INST., RENEWABLE 
ENERGY TECHNOLOGY COST REVIEW (2011), available at http://www.garnautreview.org.au/update-
2011/commissioned-work/renewable-energy-technology-cost-review.pdf. 
 231. See Davies & Allen, supra note 18, at 997 (“Indeed, the paradox inherent in feed-in 
tariffs is that they are designed to gradually self-destruct.”). It should be noted that sophisticated 
FIT design aims to address some of these risks. Germany’s FIT program, for instance, uses 
standard degression rates that anticipate cost reductions from technogy learning to provide for 
annual reductions of FIT rates without the need for regulatory action, see id. at 949. California 
recently revised its FIT program to include a renewable market adjusting tariff (ReMAT) 
mechanism that automatically adjusts FIT rates based on the program’s deployment success, 
lowering rates for higher-than expected deployment and increasing rates if deployment is lower 
than expected. For details on California’s revised FIT program, see Decision Revising Feed-In 
Tariff Program, Rulemaking 11-05-005 (Pub. Util. Comm’n of the State of Cal. May 31, 2012), 
available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/167679.pdf. 
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than FIT policies. While FITs task regulators with setting the appropriate 
rates for clean electricity, RPSs rely on the market’s invisible hand to 
determine the price of RECs intended to reward eligible generators for 
their commitment to clean, renewable sources of energy.232 Once the 
regulator’s RPS sourcing mandate has created a market for clean 
electricity and associated RECs, the clearing price for RECs in this 
market is expected to follow the basic rules of demand and supply. 
Presumably, buyers and sellers in this market possess greater knowledge 
of and experience with clean energy than regulators, suggesting that the 
former are in a better position to accurately assess the market value of 
clean electricity embodied in RECs.  
If clearing prices for REC trading turn out to be higher than expected, 
perhaps offering oligopoly rents as the result of supply constraints, 
economic theory suggests that new suppliers will enter the market 
eventually driving down the REC clearing price to competitive rent 
levels. Conversely, unexpectedly low trading prices for RECs would 
discourage market entry and eventually require utilities to bid higher in 
order to procure the RECs they need to comply with the RPS sourcing 
mandate. The market reliance of RPS programs, therefore, is designed to 
mitigate the risks associated with the regulator’s failure to appropriately 
price the cost and value of clean electricity. Market forces are expected 
to provide automatic adjustments to technology learning, cost 
improvements, and other factors that shape the value of clean electricity. 
Once again, RPS regulators prefer to trust the judgment of market 
participants rather than their own. 
RPS policies not only mitigate the risk that regulators may set 
incentives for clean energy too high or too low, or that they may fail to 
adjust them to reflect technology innovation. They also mitigate the risks 
associated with the integration of wind, solar, and other intermittent clean 
energy sources into existing electricity grids. When regulators impose 
RPS sourcing requirements, they create new markets and, at the same 
time, limit the size of these markets. RPS mandates serve as both goals 
and caps to renewable energy deployment as deployed and planned 
capacity approaches the RPS target.233 Together with the gradual ramp-
                                                                                                                     
 232. See, e.g., Trent Berry & Mark Jaccard, The Renewable Portfolio Standard: Design 
Considerations and an Implementation Survey, 29 ENERGY POL’Y 263 (2001); Karlynn S. Cory 
& Blair G. Swezey, Renewable Portfolio Standards in the States: Balancing Goals and Rules, 
ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 21. 
 233. See Mormann, supra note 211, at 712 (describing the “inherent cap in the capacity 
targets set by RPS regimes”); see also Does RPS Still Gun the Engines, RENEWABLE ENERGY 
PROJECT FIN. (Nov. 7, 2012 10:00 AM), https://financere.nrel.gov/finance/content/does-rps-still-
gun-engines (questioning the capacity of state RPS programs to drive deployment as achievement 
of the RPS target draws nearer). 
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up over several years mandated by most RPS programs, the simultaneous 
creation and limitation of clean energy markets helps regulators and, 
critically, network operators anticipate growth in order to ensure the 
grid’s ability to absorb a growing share of intermittent renewable power 
generators.  
Of course, the ability of market-based RPS policies to effectively 
mitigate these regulatory risks depends on the regulator’s success at 
creating and maintaining viable markets that function as reliable conduits 
of information, including but not limited to market pricing.234 Moreover, 
RPS-induced mitigation of the underlying regulatory risk comes at the 
cost of greater risk to investors compared to FITs. RPSs rely on not one 
but two distinct markets—the wholesale electricity market and the REC 
trading market—to deliver the necessary remuneration to promote 
renewables deployment.235  
As a result, clean energy developers and investors find themselves 
exposed to the price risk of two distinct markets with each following its 
own set of rules. Day-ahead trading in wholesale electricity markets, for 
instance, may require intermittent solar or wind generators to bid for 
capacity they may prove unable to supply when called upon.236 Similarly, 
fragmented and often illiquid REC trading markets may expose clean 
energy generators to extreme volatility as illustrated by geographic price 
fluctuations ranging from $1.75 in California to $35 in New England for 
a REC over 1 MWh of wind energy237 and temporal price fluctuations 
from $40 down to nearly $6 for 1 MWh worth of Connecticut RECs 
within a one-year period.238 Sophisticated RPS design can suggest an 
upper bound for REC trading prices by setting the penalty that utilities 
must pay for every REC they should—but fail to—procure.239 This “buy-
out” price may set a price ceiling but it does not establish a price floor. 
Consequently, a renewable power investor’s revenue from REC sales is 
left to fluctuate according to the market’s invisible hand, with regulatory 
limitations on its upside potential but not on its downside potential.  
The RPS-imposed need for clean energy generators to trade on two 
separate markets not only increases their overall market risk exposure 
but, importantly, also drives up their transaction costs. In contrast to a 
                                                                                                                     
 234. For a critique of the liquidity and volatility issues of fragmented state-level REC 
markets, see supra Subsection II.A.2.b. 
 235. See Mormann, supra note 211, at 712. 
 236. See Klessmann et al., supra note 201. 
 237. See Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got it Wrong, supra note 17. 
 238. See Ryan Wiser et al., The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the 
United States, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 8, 16. 
 239. See Klessmann et al., supra note 201, at 3653 (discussing the example of the United 
Kingdom’s Renewables Obligation). 
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FIT, an RPS requires electricity generators that rely on renewables to 
negotiate and execute one or multiple PPAs to sell their electricity 
output.240 Unless these PPAs include the transfer of associated RECs, 
generators also need to budget for navigating volatile REC markets. 
Together, these transaction costs have led to the characterization of RPSs 
as “big corporation policies” with “neutral or negative effects on smaller, 
entrepreneurial firms.”241 Finally, RPS policies may require clean energy 
developers and investors to deal with buyers—for both their power output 
and RECs—of lower creditworthiness than electric utilities thereby 
increasing the overall off-take risk. 
The dominant criticism of RPS and FIT policies supports the 
preceding observations. Critics commonly blame deficits in the observed 
cost efficiency of RPSs compared to FITs and other deployment policies 
on the greater investor risk under an RPS, which, in turn, requires higher 
returns.242 Opponents of FIT support for clean, renewable energy, 
meanwhile, draw on examples of regulatory failures to set and maintain 
FIT rates at appropriate levels to make their case.243 The allocation and 
mitigation of risk under RPS and FIT policies appear to be two sides of 
the same coin. Much in the spirit of a zero-sum game, each policy appears 
to ultimately pay the price for its respective risk treatment choices. The 
following sections explore the possibility of integrating FIT and RPS 
policies to combine their comparative strengths and mitigate their 
respective weaknesses—for a subtotal that may be greater than the sum 
of its parts. 
B.  Re-Allocating Risk: The Cost-Neutral Default 
The main challenge for successfully integrating state FIT policies with 
the American panoply of state RPSs (or a future federal RPS) is how to 
treat the ownership and transfer of RECs. FERC has noted that “[w]hile 
a state may decide that a sale of power at wholesale automatically 
transfers ownership of the state-created RECs, that requirement must find 
its authority in state law.”244 In the absence of such a clear legislative 
mandate, however, state courts have varied considerably in their 
                                                                                                                     
 240. See Mormann, supra note 211, at 713. 
 241. Bürer & Wüstenhagen, supra note 225, at 5005. 
 242. See, e.g., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, BEST AND FUTURE POLICY PRACTICE, supra note 210, 
at 131 (“[REC] certificate prices include many risk factors that are not a genuine property of RE 
technologies per se.”). 
 243. See, e.g., id. at 81 (discussing the challenges of fixed FIT rates to keep up with rapidly 
falling solar photovoltaic (PV) module prices). 
 244. American Ref-Fuel Co., Covanta Energy Grp., Montenay Power Corp., and 
Wheelabrator Techs. Inc., 105 FERC ¶ 61,004, 61,005 (2003), reh’g denied 107 FERC ¶ 61,016 
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treatment of REC ownership and transfer.245 Some have simply included 
RECs in contracts for the sale of electricity even when these contracts 
predated that state’s adoption of an RPS.246 Others have refused to 
include RECs in “purchased power,” suggesting that RECs would need 
to be transferred independently from the power output for which they 
were originally awarded.247 If renewable power generators are allowed to 
both keep their RECs and receive FIT payments, it may create windfall 
benefits. Under this latter regime, utilities would have to purchase 
renewable power at the above-market FIT rate and pay a second premium 
to buy the RECs necessary to prove compliance with their RPS sourcing 
obligations. Integration of a state FIT with a state (or federal) RPS, 
therefore, should condition tariff payments on the transfer of REC 
ownership to the local utility company in exchange for its tariff payments. 
Simply speaking, a utility’s FIT payments to renewable generators should 
buy both the electricity and the associated RECs.  
If the utility uses the RECs to prove compliance with its state (or a 
future regional/federal) RPS, the outcome is similar to that under an RPS 
without FIT support. Used RECs will be voided to prevent double 
counting and the utility recovers the cost of its RPS compliance from its 
ratepayers through including it in its retail electricity rates. The crucial 
difference between the isolated RPS scenario and the integrated RPS–FIT 
model lies in the investment certainty and market risk mitigation that the 
tariff affords renewable energy project developers and financiers.248 But 
the synergy effects of an integrated RPS–FIT regime also benefit the 
utilities and their ratepayers. Improvements in investment certainty from 
long-term FIT payments translate to greater planning certainty and lower 
financing charges, thereby driving down the RPS compliance costs of 
electric utilities. When FIT payments purchase both electricity and RECs, 
a utility’s RPS compliance costs no longer depend on the substantial price 
fluctuations of wholesale power markets and volatile REC markets.249 
Compared to the RPS-only scenario’s need for utilities to acquire 
electricity and RECs through trades on two separate markets, the 
integrated RPS–FIT scenario significantly reduces a utility’s overall 
transaction costs. Given the ability of utilities to incorporate their RPS 
compliance costs into their electricity rates, these cost savings ultimately 
                                                                                                                     
 245. For an account of the disparate judicial treatment of REC ownership and transfer, see 
Fershee, Moving Power Forward, supra note 17, at 1410–15. 
 246. See Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 931 A.2d 159, 174 n.23 
(Conn. 2007) (reporting inclusive treatment of RECs for at least nine states). 
 247. See N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n, 168 P.3d 105, 
116 (N.M. 2007). 
 248. See MORMANN, supra note 211, at 712–13 (comparing the investment certainty offered 
by RPS and FIT policies, noting that “feed-in tariffs offer the highest overall level of certainty to 
investors in renewable energy technologies”). 
 249. Supra Subsection II.A.2.b. 
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pass on to ratepayers in the form of lower electricity bills. Figure 1 
illustrates the flow of electricity, revenue, and RECs in the cost-neutral, 
default scenario. 
 
Figure 1: Flow of Electricity, Revenue, and RECs in Joint RPS–FIT Regime250 
C.  Re-Allocating Risk: The Profit-Oriented Option 
To realize their full potential, integrated RPS–FIT programs can foster 
interstate competition over renewable energy deployment. To this end, 
regulators ought to give electric utilities a choice of how to treat the RECs 
they receive in exchange for their tariff payments. By default, utilities can 
continue to recoup the cost of FIT payments by passing them on to their 
ratepayers and, thus, make their RPS compliance relatively cost-neutral, 
as illustrated above.251 As an alternative to this cost-neutral option, 
utilities should be allowed (and encouraged) to choose a second, profit-
                                                                                                                     
 250. Mormann, supra note 214, at 16.  
 251. This is the situation under most existing RPS mandates that allow utilities to pass their 
compliance costs on to their ratepayers, for example, in the form of a fuel surcharge. See, e.g., 
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oriented option where, rather than simply using all their RECs for RPS 
compliance, utilities can sell some of their RECs to other in-state utilities, 
out-of-state utilities and other buyers to make a profit. As in the cost-
neutral default scenario, the utilities would still need to pay renewable 
power generators the guaranteed FIT rates. Under the profit-oriented 
option, however, the utility trades all or part of its ability to recover the 
cost of these FIT payments from its ratepayers for the opportunity to 
recoup the cost of its RPS compliance on the open market and make a 
profit in the process. This option will be particularly interesting where 
state FIT programs deliver so much deployment that they effectively 
require utilities to purchase more renewable power and, hence, buy more 
RECs than they need for compliance with their local RPS mandate.  
The critical difference between the profit-oriented option available 
under an integrated RPS–FIT regime and the cost-neutral default lies in 
the allocation of risk. Renewable energy investors and project developers 
are wary of REC-related risk, especially where it exposes them to volatile 
and unfamiliar REC markets.252 Electric utility companies, in turn, have 
substantial experience with these types of markets253 and possess the 
resources and expertise to navigate them successfully. As a result, utilities 
are better bearers of REC-related risk than renewable energy developers 
or investors. 
Innovative retail rate regulation can incentivize electric utilities to 
assume REC risk, e.g., by allowing utilities to keep a share of their trading 
gains. The remainder of these gains is passed on to ratepayers, offering 
an additional option to refinance state FIT programs. Such profit-sharing 
arrangements are not entirely novel and, in fact, continue to gain 
importance in the context of energy efficiency initiatives, where state 
regulators allow their utility companies to keep part of the savings 
resulting from reduced electricity consumption.254 Properly designed, 
these profit-sharing arrangements can provide additional incentives for 
the cost-effective design and administration of state FIT policy. The 
greater the deployment success of a state’s FIT program, the more RECs 
its utilities will have at their disposal to trade for market profits. As new, 
independently owned, renewable energy assets gradually displace utility-
owned, conventional energy assets, utilities and regulators become 
increasingly concerned over the long-term viability of today’s utility 
                                                                                                                     
 252. See Bürer & Wüstenhagen, supra note 225, at 5005; Lüthi & Prässler, supra note 225, 
at 4889–90.  
 253. In many ways, REC markets resemble the markets for SO2 allowances created more 
than twenty years ago under the Clean Air Act’s acid-rain trading scheme. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–
7651o. 
 254. For a detailed discussion of profit-sharing arrangements and decoupling in the context 
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48
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/3
2015] CLEAN ENERGY FEDERALISM 1669 
 
business model.255 The profit-oriented approach enables utilities and their 
shareholders to earn a profit even as they produce and sell less of their 
own electricity, helping prepare them for the next generation of utility 
business models. 
The more cost-efficiently a FIT leverages deployment of renewable 
power assets, the greater the profit margin from REC sales will be for 
utilities and their shareholders. If innovative State A manages to design 
and implement a particularly effective yet cost-efficient, integrated RPS–
FIT regime, then its utilities can export their RECs to other RPS states, 
such as State B, in order to increase State A’s profits and, in the process, 
lower the overall cost to ratepayers of its public policy support for clean 
energy deployment and climate change mitigation.256 Conversely, a FIT 
that proves ineffective (such as that of Palo Alto) or inefficient (such as 
Spain’s original solar FIT) would diminish, if not altogether eliminate, 
the utilities’ ability to sell their RECs for a profit. These dynamics can 
provide powerful incentives for utilities to not only implement but also 
help improve local FIT policies because greater efficacy and efficiency 
translate to greater profits for the utility. In the context of interstate 
competition, integrated RPS–FIT regimes can provide powerful financial 
incentives for utilities to operate in and, hence, help create a renewable 
energy policy environment that outperforms other states and their REC 
markets. Figure 2 illustrates the flow of revenue and RECs in the profit-
oriented, interstate competition scenario. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 255. Id.; Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean a Death 
Spiral for Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 1, 30–34 (2014) (discussing the threat that increasing 
solar PV deployment poses to the traditional utility business model).  See also CALIFORNIA ISO, 
WHAT THE DUCK CURVE TELLS US ABOUT MANAGING A GREEN GRID (2013), available at 
http://www.caiso.com/documents/flexibleresourceshelprenewables_fastfacts.pdf. 
 256. In fact, similar dynamics may also be present at a regional, intra-state level. Consider 
the example of Utilities A, B, and C that all operate within the same state and under the same RPS. 
Thanks to, say, streamlined permitting and interconnection processes, Utility A is more effective 
and efficient in its implementation of the state-wide (or its local) FIT program than Utilities B and 
C. A, therefore, acquires more RECs than B and C while paying less for them. As a result, Utility 
A will likely be able to sell its surplus RECs at a profit to Utilities B and C. 
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Figure 2: Flow of Revenue and RECs in Joint RPS–FIT Regime with Interstate 
Competition257 
By giving utilities a meaningful, potentially profit-bearing stake in the 
successful deployment of independently owned and operated renewable 
energy assets, integrated RPS–FIT regimes effectively enlist the utility 
industry to help optimize clean energy policy. The resulting collaboration 
between regulators and utilities reallocates and thereby helps mitigate the 
regulatory risk that often taints standalone FIT programs relying on 
regulators to set and maintain appropriate rates, interconnection 
requirements, and other parameters for the quickly evolving, complex 
renewable energy industry with limited, if any, help from utility experts. 
                                                                                                                     
 257. Mormann, supra note 214, at 17.  
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From a risk allocation and mitigation perspective, the integrated RPS–
FIT model combines the best of both worlds. FIT policy provides critical 
mitigation of off-take and other market risk for renewable energy project 
developers and investors. At the same time, FIT programs offer utilities 
a cost-neutral way of complying with state or federal RPS mandates and 
reduce the utilities’ transaction costs and REC market risk. The existence 
of viable REC markets, meanwhile, provides crucial benchmarking for 
the proper determination of FIT rates thereby reducing the regulatory risk 
that commonly plagues FITs. In addition, integrated RPS–FIT regimes 
can harness the competitive market forces inherent in RPS policies and 
redirect them to ensure optimal risk allocation. In interstate competition, 
these forces can reduce the cost to ratepayers of FIT programs and RPS 
compliance while driving sustainable deployment of clean energy 
technologies. This section draws on the U.S. electricity market to make 
the case for integration of RPS and FIT policies.258 The underlying risk 
allocation dynamics and the resulting policy recommendations, however, 
could, with some modifications, be applied to other jurisdictions with a 
similarly federal(-esque) system of electricity market regulation and 
governance, such as China, India, and the European Union, among 
others.259 
IV.  CONCEPTUALIZING CLEAN ENERGY FEDERALISM 
The preceding inquiry into the institutional questions surrounding RPS 
and FIT policy implementation and the proposed model for an integrated 
RPS–FIT regime yield valuable insights for the emerging literature on 
clean energy federalism and its import for the theories that shape today’s 
discourse on environmental federalism and policy. 
At a glance, the finding that FITs promise greater clean energy 
deployment and more effective climate change mitigation if implemented 
by the states rather than the federal government appears to call into 
question the matching principle’s tenet that the geographic scale of 
pollution should determine the appropriate institutional level for 
addressing that pollution. After all, pollution from the power sector’s 
greenhouse gas emissions manifests itself at a global scale. Accordingly, 
scale matching would appear to suggest that the locus of FIT 
implementation and related policy action should be the national, if not the 
                                                                                                                     
 258. It should be noted that implementation of the proposed, integrated RPS–FIT model 
would raise a range of intriguing questions related to federalism and electricity market regulation 
(among others) that lie beyond the scope of this Article and are the subject of future research. 
 259. This Article focuses on the U.S. model of federalism. Internationally, federally 
structured countries come in a variety of different flavors, some with weaker central governments 
(e.g., Canada, Switzerland), others with stronger central governments (e.g., Russia), requiring a 
differential treatment that lies beyond the scope of this Article. 
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international forum. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that this Article’s 
recommendation for global climate change mitigation through state-level 
FITs can, in fact, be reconciled with a more nuanced application of the 
matching principle, one that acknowledges the multiplicity of 
environmental and economic factors implicated by pollution and 
abatement policy.260 
The suggestion that RPS policy best be implemented at the federal 
level should be well received by proponents of the traditional public 
choice narrative who, through much of the twentieth century, cited 
agency capture and other distortions from well organized, cohesive 
industry groups as a major obstacle to effective policymaking at the sub-
federal level, especially in the environmental law arena. More recent 
accounts of public choice theory, however, point to similar risks of 
agency capture at the federal level and posit that the national aggregation 
of diverse environmental interests can jeopardize their homogeneity and 
thereby exacerbate organizational problems. Accordingly, neither the 
federal nor the sub-federal forum should a priori be deemed the better 
locus for environmental policy making.  This Article’s recommendation 
that one clean energy policy (RPS) be implemented at the federal and 
another (FIT) at the state level offers support for this more open ended, 
modern public choice narrative.261 
Finally, the preceding case studies in clean energy federalism have 
explored many of the factors that govern institutional inquiries using 
dynamic federalism theory. Besides scale matching, dynamic federalism 
also examines the import of parallel policy action at various levels of 
governance, the evolution of regulatory authority and its historic 
allocation within the federal system. With its call for parallel and 
coordinated policy action by multiple states and/or by both federal and 
state governments, the proposed model for closer integration of RPS and 
FIT policies262 offers a poignant example of dynamic federalism theory 
in action.263 
A.  Classic Federalism and the Matching Principle 
The proper allocation of regulatory authority across federal, state, and 
local government has been a topic of scholarly debate since the founding 
fathers crafted the Constitution.264 Classic federalism theory commonly 
                                                                                                                     
 260. Infra Section IV.A. 
 261. Infra Section IV.B. 
 262. See supra Sections III.B and III.C. 
 263. Infra Section IV.C. 
 264. See Osofsky & Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, supra note 28, at 807; see also 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 62–63 (James Madison’s account of federalism). 
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seeks to resolve the issue of multilevel governance based on the 
government’s internalization of the costs and benefits associated with 
new policy.265 This theory deems federal regulation preferable to state-
level regulation if the former can avoid spillover effects or externalities 
that would arise from the latter.266 The classical school of federalism rests 
on the presumption that “better” policies emerge when policy makers 
weigh all relevant costs and benefits.267 Against this background, the 
environmental federalism literature has developed the “matching 
principle” to guide the determination of the most efficient level of 
governance.268 According to the matching principle, “the size of the 
geographic area affected by a specific pollution source should determine 
the appropriate governmental level for responding to the pollution.”269 
Such scale matching has become a staple of classic federalism theory.270 
At a glance, application of the matching principle to climate and clean 
energy policy appears to suggest the federal, not state, forum as the ideal 
level for policy innovation. The Supreme Court has clarified that the 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions driving global warming and 
climate change271 constitute air pollutants under the Clean Air Act.272 
Climate science indicates that the heat-trapping effect of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere manifests itself across the globe regardless of 
                                                                                                                     
 265. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1498 
(1994) (“[S]tate regulation was defended as a means of adapting law to local conditions and tastes, 
while national regulation was thought necessary to prevent mutually disadvantageous attempts by 
states to impose costs on each other . . . .”). 
 266. See, e.g., Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, supra note 138, at 1222 
(describing the presence of interstate externalities as “a powerful reason for intervention at the 
federal level”); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating 
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1215–16 (1977) 
(discussing physical, psychic, and economic spillover effects). For an instructive example of such 
interstate spillover or externalities, see Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary 
Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 932 (1997) (describing transboundary pollution as a “clear case for 
shifting regulatory authority from local to more centralized levels of governance”). 
 267. See Butler & Macey, supra note 29, at 25; see also David E. Adelman, Environmental 
Federalism When Numbers Matter More Than Size, 32 UCLA J. EVTL. L. & POL’Y 238, 308 
(2014) (“For the classical school, the primary consideration is whether regulatory agencies 
internalize the environmental costs and benefits of their policies.”).  
 268. See Butler & Macey, supra note 29, at 25 (tracing their matching principle back to 
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCH, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 113–16 (1962)). 
 269. See Butler & Macey, supra note 29, at 25. 
 270. See, e.g., Osofsky & Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, supra note 28, at 807 
(“The vast majority of this scholarship focuses on ‘scale matching’ . . . .”). 
 271. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1, at 13–14 
(discussing drivers of global warming and climate change). 
 272. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (“[G]reenhouse gases 
fit well within the Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant’ . . . .”). 
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whether these gases are emitted in New York or New Delhi.273 To match 
the size of the geographic area affected by greenhouse gas pollution, as 
prescribed by the matching principle, policy to mitigate climate change 
should therefore be implemented at the global level or, in the absence of 
international consensus, at least at the federal level. By itself, however, 
this view fails to consider the cornucopia of other, often more localized, 
costs and benefits that climate and clean energy policy can create.  
To be sure, many of the environmental and other societal costs 
associated with anthropogenic climate change and the benefits derived 
from its successful mitigation accrue to the global population at large. 
But these are not the only costs imposed by greenhouse gas emissions or 
the only benefits from their reduction through successful climate change 
mitigation. FIT, RPS, and other climate and clean energy policies have 
the potential to significantly reduce the locally incurred environmental 
costs of electricity generation. By displacing coal and other carbon-
intensive power with solar, wind, and other low-carbon, renewable 
power, these policies help mitigate environmental problems and adverse 
health impacts from air pollutants concentrated around fossil fuel-fired 
power plants.274 Another, more localized environmental benefit from 
FIT, RPS, and other climate policy lies in the capacity of renewable 
power generation to conserve precious water resources.275  
From an economic perspective, climate policy that promotes 
greenhouse gas pollution abatement also encourages refinement of 
existing and development of new abatement technologies, such as those 
related to renewable energy generation.276 Accordingly, implementation 
of FIT, RPS, and other innovative policies to address global climate 
change fosters technological innovation.277 In fact, empirical work has 
long highlighted the net positive employment effects of climate change 
mitigation through the build-out of renewable power capacity. Some 
analysts forecast that by 2030, one out of every four U.S. workers, i.e., 
37 million Americans, could work in the renewable energy and energy 
                                                                                                                     
 273. For an instructive example of the globally felt effects of greenhouse gas emissions, 
independent of their point of origin, see the Environmental Protection Agency’s unsuccessful 
argument that regulation of domestic greenhouse gas emissions would be ineffective due to 
projected increases in greenhouse gas emissions from China, India, and other developing nations. 
See id. at 523–24. 
 274. See Levy & Spengler, supra note 106, at 2. 
 275. See, e.g., Sovacool & Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong, supra note 17, at 127–28 (noting 
how a federal RPS can help to conserve water). 
 276. See Kolev & Riess, supra note 6, at 137 (discussing the impact of environmental policy 
on technology innovation). 
 277. See generally Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Policy and Technological Change, 
22 ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 41 (2002) [hereinafter Jaffe et al., Environmental Policy] (examining the 
relationship between environmental policy and technological change). 
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efficiency industries—assuming appropriate public policy support.278 
Others emphasize that a renewables-based energy economy will create 
more jobs per megawatt of power installed, per unit of energy produced, 
and per dollar of investment than today’s fossil fuel-based energy 
economy.279 Critically, the vast majority of these jobs are created 
locally—in construction, operation, or maintenance, among others—even 
if solar panels, wind turbines, and other equipment are imported from 
foreign manufacturers.280 The recent climate policy activism at the state 
and even municipal levels confirms the importance of and appreciation 
for these and other localized costs and benefits associated with climate 
change and its successful mitigation.  
This Article’s exercise in clean energy federalism does not seek to 
invalidate the matching principle but rather calls for applying it with 
greater nuance. In their original form, the matching principle and classic 
federalism theory focus primarily, if not exclusively, on the top-level, 
farthest-reaching effects of a given pollution source or other policy issue. 
This emphasis is considered necessary to avoid spillover effects and 
externalities that may result from addressing a pollution or other policy 
issue with only partial geographic coverage.281 In the process, however, 
the matching principle may overlook other more localized but 
nevertheless critical impacts and considerations. The tenet that 
“regulatory authority should go to the political jurisdiction that comes 
closest to matching the geographic area affected by a particular 
externality”282 presumes that policy makers can effectively isolate 
different issues and externalities to address them individually. In reality, 
public policy often lacks the surgical precision of a ten-blade. 
Environmentally motivated and targeted policy inevitably entails 
economic policy, such as pollution policy that increases short-term 
production costs while promoting long-term innovation of abatement 
technologies.283 Together, these and other considerations may not only 
                                                                                                                     
 278. See AM. SOLAR ENERGY SOC’Y, DEFINING, ESTIMATING, AND FORECASTING THE 
RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. AND IN COLORADO 33 
(2008), available at http://cospl.coalliance.org/fedora/repository/co:2056. 
 279. See Max Wei et al., Putting Renewables and Energy Efficiency to Work: How Many 
Jobs Can the Clean Energy Industry Generate in the U.S.?, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 919, 919–20 
(2010); see also DANIEL M. KAMMEN ET AL., PUTTING RENEWABLES TO WORK: HOW MANY JOBS 
CAN THE CLEAN ENERGY INDUSTRY CREATE? 1, 3 (2004) (including a meta-analysis of thirteen 
studies on the employment effects associated with the large-scale deployment of low-carbon, 
renewable energy capacity). 
 280. See id. at 6, 12–13. 
 281. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
 282. Butler & Macey, supra note 29, at 53. 
 283. See Kolev & Riess, supra note 6, at 137; see also Jaffe et al., Environmental Policy, 
supra note 277, at 61. 
55
Mormann: Clean Energy Federalism
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1676 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
justify but mandate policy implementation with less-than-complete 
geographic coverage as illustrated by the RPS and FIT case studies in 
climate and clean energy policy.284  
B.  Public Choice Theory  
When Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow published his seminal work 
Social Choice and Individual Values,285 he laid the foundation for a new 
field of social science that has become a dominant theme in contemporary 
legal scholarship.286 Originally derived from microeconomics, public 
choice theory treats regulatory decision-making as an analogue to market 
decision-making.287 According to this analogy, legislative, regulatory, 
and electoral institutions form an economy in which various actors, 
including citizens, interest groups, and policy makers, exchange 
regulatory goods based on the same market principles governing the 
demand and supply of ordinary economic goods.288 Regulatory goods run 
the policy-making gamut from direct subsidies to tariffs to market and 
price controls.289 A central tenet of public choice theory is that organized 
groups enjoy greater influence in the regulatory marketplace than 
individual voters because the group’s greater aggregate benefits from a 
given regulatory good enable it to outbid the individual voter.290  
Today public choice theory informs scholarly analysis of judicial and 
administrative decision-making processes across a wide range of 
substantive contexts.291 The federalism literature also has embraced it as 
                                                                                                                     
 284. See supra Subsection II.B.2. 
 285. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951). 
 286. See Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice in Practice and Theory, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1657, 
1657 (1993) (“While its origins lie in microeconomics, public choice theory has clearly become 
one of the dominant themes in contemporary legal scholarship.”). 
 287. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34–56 (1998) (offering an overview and critique of public choice 
theory). 
 288. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories of Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 
335–36 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3–4 (1971). 
 289. See Stigler, supra note 288, at 4–6. 
 290. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 287, at 39–40 (“[T]he regulatory market works, on the 
whole, to the advantage of organized groups with narrow interests.”). 
 291. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of 
Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988) (applying public 
choice theory to statutory interpretation by the courts); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory 
and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 715 (2013) (discussing the application of 
public choice theory to the issue of overcriminalization); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign 
Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First 
Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505 (1982) (applying public choice theory to ballot measures and 
campaign spending); Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory 
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a powerful tool for resolving multilevel governance issues.292 For much 
of the twentieth century, the prevailing public choice narrative for 
federalism theory favored federal over state action, citing agency capture 
and other distortions from well-organized, cohesive industry groups as a 
major deterrent to effective policy making at the sub-federal level.293 In 
the environmental federalism literature, several commentators have 
sought to bolster the pro-federal implications of public choice theory by 
highlighting the difficulties and transaction costs of mobilizing and 
coordinating heterogeneous environmental interests in fifty or more 
separate and disparate jurisdictions.294 Centralized policy making at the 
federal level is considered to mitigate these challenges by offering 
economies of scale and reduced transaction costs to diffuse 
environmental interests as they rally toward concerted policy action in a 
single forum.295 Others have pushed back against the pro-federal account 
of public choice theory, warning that the national aggregation of diverse 
environmental interests jeopardizes their homogeneity and, in the 
process, exacerbates organizational problems of interest groups.296 
                                                                                                                     
of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43 (1988) (discussing the relationship between public 
choice theory in the context of legislation, the theory of the firm, and the theory of market 
exchange); Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism After All?, 
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219 (1997) (arguing that public choice theory justifies judicial 
activism); Matthew L. Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Processes: An Application of Public Choice 
Theory to Bakke, the FCC, and the Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 717 (1979) (applying public choice 
theory to medical school admissions decisions, Federal Communications Commission hearings 
decisions, and judicial decision processes). For a comprehensive account of the widespread 
adoption of public choice theory by legal scholarship, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, 
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 1–11 (1991). 
 292. See generally Stefania A. Di Trolio, Public Choice Theory, Federalism, and the Sunny 
Side to Blue-Sky Laws, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1279, 1282 (2004) (applying public choice 
theory to conclude that the best way to protect the public is to encourage state enforcement of 
securities laws); Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic 
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265 
(1990) (discussing Congress’s deferral of regulation to local regulators and its relationship to 
public choice theory); Revesz, Race to the Bottom, supra note 138 (discussing the application of 
public choice theory to the justification of federal regulation of environmental protection); 
Thomas S. Ulen, Economic and Public-Choice Forces in Federalism, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 921, 
924 (1998) (analyzing public choice theory to help understand the costs of having “competing 
jurisdictions within a federal structure”). 
 293. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 291, at 73–78.  
 294. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 138, at 650–51 (noting that “state and local environmental 
policy manipulation often goes unnoticed”); Stewart, supra note 266, at 1213 (pointing to the 
“formidable transaction costs” facing individual stakeholders seeking to organize for concerted 
action). 
 295. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National 
Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225, 285–86 
(1997). 
 296. See Revesz, Race to the Bottom, supra note 138, at 563 & n.35 (citing JACK L. WALKER, 
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Moreover, the theory of collective action suggests that members of a 
larger group have less incentive than those of smaller groups to 
coordinate toward achieving a collective benefit.297 Accordingly, some 
have cautioned that based on public choice theory, “it is not clear whether 
environmental interests will systematically fare better at the federal or at 
the state level.”298 
The preceding RPS and FIT case studies in clean energy federalism 
support the skepticism over the traditional public choice narrative’s 
general endorsement of federal over state and other sub-federal policy 
action. Advocates of state RPS programs often point to the political 
landscape and its collective action challenges to make their case: 
“[R]elative to the nation as a whole, the geographic scale of states can 
present a more manageable forum for policy development.”299 Even the 
most fervent proponents of federal climate and clean energy policy 
acknowledge the significant difficulties of reaching a national consensus 
over U.S. clean energy policy: “[F]or too long, the pursuit of a ‘silver 
bullet’ national renewable energy strategy, embraced by all and 
burdensome to none, has kept the capacity of renewable generation 
ludicrously below its potential.”300 Recent congressional history shows 
how difficult it is to build the necessary consensus for a strong federal 
RPS, FIT, or other climate and clean energy policy.301 To be sure, the 
state forum, too, has oft proven unfertile ground for RPS and FIT 
proposals.302 Yet, through extensive trial and error, a remarkable twenty-
                                                                                                                     
MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS, PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 66 
(1991) (discussing the difficulties groups with highly decentralized constituents face to organize 
and speak with a unified voice in Washington, D.C.)). 
 297. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 132 (Schocken Books ed., 3d ed. 1963); see also Croley, supra note 287, at 
13 (“[T]he logic of collective action implies that, under certain circumstances, the bigger the 
‘public’ in question the farther below the desirable level will the supply of public goods be.”). 
 298. Revesz, Race to the Bottom, supra note 138, at 577. See also Emily Hammond & David 
L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 
37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 319, 351–53 (2013) (noting the responsiveness of EPA and, 
ultimately, state policy makers to concerns raised by petitions seeking withdrawal of state 
authority to implement the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and other major federal environmental 
statutes). 
 299. Doran, supra note 148, at 97; see also Thomas D. Peterson & Adam Z. Rose, Reducing 
Conflicts Between Climate Policy and Energy Policy in the US: The Important Role of the States, 
34 ENERGY POL’Y 619, 619–20 (2006). 
 300. Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Green Means “Go?”—a Colorful 
Approach to a U.S. National Renewable Portfolio Standard, ELECTRICITY J., Aug.–Sept. 2006, at 
19, 30. 
 301. See, e.g., Davies, Power Forward, supra note 14, at 1341; Welton, supra note 14, at 
996. 
 302. See the examples of failed state legislative initiatives mentioned supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. 
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nine states, the District of Columbia, and three U.S territories have 
implemented state RPS programs, FIT programs, or both.303  
The ongoing debate in the environmental federalism literature and this 
Article’s exercise in clean energy federalism both suggest that public 
choice theory should not be relied on for a general, a priori endorsement 
of federal over state policy action. The kaleidoscope of factors at play in 
the regulatory marketplace, including the nature of the regulatory good in 
question and the range of interested actors, calls for a more nuanced, 
open-ended public choice inquiry that may, on a case-by-case basis, point 
to either the federal or state forum, or both, for implementation of climate 
and clean energy policy.  
C.  Dynamic Federalism 
The literature on dynamic federalism seeks to resolve issues of 
multilevel governance by moving beyond classic federalism’s focus on 
the linearly defined, alternative relationship between state and federal 
actors. Instead, dynamic federalism theory draws on multilayered, 
interdependent models of governance to incorporate interactions both 
between and among various levels of government.304 Consideration of 
inter- and intra-agency relationships along vertical and horizontal axes 
has yielded a more spatialized, multidimensional approach to 
federalism.305 Recent scholarship has further explored the iterative, 
temporal dimension of federalism dynamics.306 
Applied to climate and clean energy policy, dynamic federalism 
theory would consider many, if not all, of the factors explored in the 
                                                                                                                     
 303. Seven of the twenty-nine RPS states—California, Hawaii, Maine, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, and Washington—have adopted FIT regimes. See supra note 15. 
 304. For examples of the rich and growing literature on dynamic federalism covering a broad 
range of subjects, see generally Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism 
in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006) (arguing for a dynamic view of federalism in 
environmental law where environmental issues may handled at either the state or federal level); 
Harrop A. Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 
630 (1972) (discussing the concept of preemption within the context of dynamic federalism); 
Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 
CONN. INS. L.J. 107 (2004) (discussing the need for a multilevel approach to securities 
enforcement); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 
449, 451 (2010) (critiquing the “top-down, national only approach to patent reform” and arguing 
that patent reform can take place at both the national and local level); Osofsky & Wiseman, 
Dynamic Energy Federalism, supra note 28 (proposing a new model grounded in dynamic 
federalism to better meet the need for reliable energy sources). 
 305. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 22, at 1550–55; Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 493, 495 (2008); Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change 
Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 241 (2011). 
 306. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1097, 1114–18 (2009). 
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preceding case studies of FIT and RPS policy. In addition to the classical 
school’s scale matching,307 dynamic federalism examines and weighs the 
import of parallel policy action at various levels of governance,308 from 
federal to state to local agencies,309 as well as the evolution of regulatory 
authority and its historical allocation within the federal system.310 
The nuanced, seemingly inconsistent recommendation for 
implementation of RPS policy at the federal and FIT policy at the state 
level represents the logical conclusion to dynamic federalism theory’s 
multipolar consideration of intra- and inter-agency relationships. The 
overlay of horizontal and vertical axes with a temporal dimension yields 
an institutionally agnostic approach to solving multilevel governance 
challenges. The proposed model for closer integration of RPS and FIT 
policies311 operationalizes dynamic federalism theory by harnessing the 
capacity of regulators at any level of government to act effectively both 
in concert and, where appropriate, in competition with one another. 
CONCLUSION 
Ten years ago, energy was described as “the center stage upon which 
environmental law, certainly in terms of global warming and many other 
environmental issues, will be played.”312 Over the past decade, hydraulic 
fracturing for shale gas and oil, nuclear reactor (re)licensing, biofuel 
mandates for the transport sector, integration of a growing share of 
renewables into the electricity mix, and other controversies at the 
intersection of environmental and energy law have proven these words 
downright visionary. Along the way, clean energy law has begun to 
emancipate itself from environmental law in the scholarly debate. 
Drawing on the well-established environmental federalism literature, the 
emerging literature on clean energy federalism is a symptom of clean 
energy law’s coming of age. This Article adds to that literature by 
offering two case studies, a novel model for policy integration, and 
theoretical insights to the clean energy federalism literature. 
FIT and RPS policies both seek to mitigate climate change by 
promoting the build-out of low-carbon, renewable energy infrastructure. 
Yet, subtle differences in both policies’ design characteristics point to 
different policy implementation pathways. Existing regulatory authority 
and the greater ability to account for local needs and opportunities 
suggest that FIT programs are better suited for implementation at the state 
rather than federal level. RPS policy, on the other hand, requires a market 
                                                                                                                     
 307. See supra Subsections II.A.1, II.A.2, II.B.2 and III.A. 
 308. See supra Subsections II.A.3, II.B.1 and II.C.2. 
 309. See supra Subsections II.C.2. 
 310. See supra Subsections II.B.3 and II.C.1. 
 311. See supra Sections III.B and III.C. 
 312. Ferrey, supra note 149, at 262. 
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size and uniformity of such scale that it is better implemented at the 
federal rather than state level. 
Contrary to the literature’s traditional view that RPS and FIT policies 
represent mutually exclusive policy alternatives, this Article proposes a 
model for closely integrating both policies toward a better, more efficient 
allocation of investor and regulatory risk. Properly integrated, a joint 
RPS–FIT regime could harness the competitive market forces inherent in 
portfolio standards and redirect them to optimize overall risk allocation. 
In interstate competition, these forces would help reduce the cost to 
ratepayers of FIT programs. With aggregate risk mitigation greater than 
the sum of its parts, such an integrated RPS–FIT regime could leverage 
higher private-sector investment in renewables while requiring lower 
returns than necessary under less coordinated current policy approaches. 
From a theoretical perspective, this Article offers insights to elucidate 
the relationship between environmental federalism and clean energy 
federalism. Specifically, these insights call for a more nuanced, multi-
dimensional application of environmental federalism’s matching 
principle, offer support for a more open-ended, institutionally agnostic 
public choice narrative, and operationalize dynamic federalism theory in 
the clean energy arena. 
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